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system resources with impunity.  This malicious software has infiltrated common search 
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arriving at an improved definition of spyware.  It identifies four common activities 
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API Application Programming Interface. 
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network. 
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange. 
BotNets An army of compromised Internet-connected computers controlled 
by a remote attacker. 
Cookie Text files issued by a web server and stored in a client, used by 
web browsers to maintain session state information and identify 
users for web customization [3]. 
CPU Central Processing Unit. 
Daemons A program that executes without human intervention to accomplish 
a task.  Associated with Unix systems, equivalent to services in 
Windows systems. 
DOS A network attack designed to disrupt availability. 
EULA End User License Agreement. 
FRAME An HTML tag used for dividing a web page into separate and 
distinct sections. 
Hacker People proficient in computer programming and hardware inner 
workings who exploit systems through skill and tactics. 
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol. Used to create documents on the 
World Wide Web. 
IFRAME HTML tag which allows for inline frames, frames within a block 
of text. 
IP Internet Protocol. 
Key logger A computer program or hardware device used to capture 
keystrokes and initially used in diagnostics. 
Libpcap A system-independent interface used in network packet capture.  
Libpcap file formats are used by a variety of network traffic 
capture software. 
NAME HTML tag parameter used for identification purposes. 
NAT Network Address Translation. 
PID Process identifier. 
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Rootkit A type of Trojan horse which hides itself, other files, and network 
connections. Runs at the kernel level of the machine and is able to 
intercept all API calls [35]. 
Services In Windows, a program, routine, or process that performs a 
specific system task without user intervention. 
Spam Remailer Computer programs designed to forward SPAM by using 
compromised computer’s bandwidth resources. 
SPAM Unsolicited email considered bulk mailing from a senders point of 
view and junk email from a receiver’s point of view. 
SRC HTML tag parameter providing information on source of an image 
or other. 
Surfing The act of following hyperlinks or browsing Internet web pages. 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol. 
Tracks Spyware program category considered by some and associated 
with the collection of information maintained by various 
applications. For example, collecting recent opened documents or 
web browser history information. 
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UDP User Datagram Protocol. 
UNICODE An international standard of codes used to represent letters, 
numbers, control characters, and others in computers. 
URL Uniform Resource Locator. 
Virus Self-replicating program that propagates by inserting identical or 
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Warez Pirated commercial software made available to the public and for 
which copy protection or registration requirements have been 
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organizations to track information about the viewer. Information 
collected may include IP address, hostname, operating system, web 
browser type, and date image was viewed [25, 50]. 
Worm A self-contained self-replicating computer program similar to a 
virus which unlike a virus, does not need to be part of another 
program to propagate. 
Zero-day-exploit Computer program or technique used to exploit unpublished or 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber attacks in the Internet have been increasing in both frequency and 
complexity, and a strong emphasis on wealth appropriation through illegal means has 
taken over the once ideals-driven or attention-driven hacker activities of the 1980’s and 
1990’s.  The spyware industry has flourished on both sides of the legal and ethical fence, 
and has thrived where legal issues are gray.  It has become one of the greatest threats to 
cyberspace at a time when our society relies heavily on such network of networks.  
Continued vulnerability discoveries and limited user awareness, coupled with an urge to 
interconnect vulnerable systems to vulnerable networks have placed our personal privacy, 
financial infrastructure, and national secrets at risk. 
For the United States, the information technology revolution quietly 
changed the way business and government operate.  Without a great deal 
of thought about security, the Nation shifted the control of essential 
processes in manufacturing, utilities, banking, and communications to 
networked computers [53]. 
The National Strategy To Secure Cyberspace released by the White House in 
February 2003 provides guidelines and encourages cooperation between government and 
private industry with the hope of curbing a troubling trend.  As the report states, 
“Cyberspace has become the nervous system – the control system of our country.” 
It is this control system, which came under coordinated repeated attack in 2004, 
with the deployment of what became known as the Download.ject attack.  Several web 
sites hosted by Microsoft’s Internet Information Services Web server (IIS) were 
compromised.  Although the exact number of businesses was not disclosed, it was 
reported that numerous large Internet institutions, including banks, insurance companies, 
auction outlets, and other main stream web sites were compromised [27]. The attack 
consisted of the addition of code which capitalized on Internet Explorer client 
vulnerabilities to install key logging and Trojan horse software in visitor’s computers by 
the mere action of visiting the compromised web site.  Similar attacks affecting Apache 
web servers were also noted during 2004 [4]. Sensitive information such as Social  
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Security Numbers, credit card numbers, user names and corresponding passwords, and 
encrypted communications between client browsers and financial institution web sites 
were targeted by these various attacks [4, 8, 52, 69]. 
Often, it has been said that high risk behavior on the Internet leads to infection by 
spyware, viruses, Trojan horses, key loggers and the like.  The use of peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks, the downloading of freeware and shareware, and the visiting of hacker-
or warez-related web sites, as well as adult entertainment and gambling-related web sites 
might be considered “high risk behavior” as it is generally considered to lead to increased 
risk of infection.  However, there is ample evidence that the compromise of main-stream 
web sites can also lead to infection of their visitors while they conduct activities generally 
considered “safe” or “low risk.”  Little has been mentioned about relatively trusted and 
popular destinations of the Internet until the attacks of 2004. 
The objective of this research is to better understand spyware by conducting a 
review of the various types of spyware, mode of infection, and associated spyware 
activities.  Additionally, an evaluation of relatively “safe” main stream sectors of the 
Internet is conducted with four different test bed platforms consisting of default 
unpatched installations of Windows XP with Internet Explorer or Firefox Internet 
browsers, and fully patched Windows XP SP2 platforms with Internet Explorer or 
Firefox Internet browsers.  By evaluating eight different “safe” Internet sectors in 
addition to three “high risk” Internet sectors, the intent is to provide a better 
understanding of the risks of one browser over another (a default Windows XP 
installation over a fully patched installation) and a ranking of several Internet sectors, in 
the context of spyware drive-by-download infection. 
Chapter II provides background information on the various network technologies 
giving rise to spyware software development.  The hardware and languages used in the 
execution of the experiments conducted as part of this work are also described. 
Chapter III provides an analysis of current spyware definitions.  It explains 
reasons for the difficulty in arriving at a consensus working definition of spyware among  
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security professionals and provides a new definition based on common activities noted 
among spyware programs.  The chapter also discusses four main infection vectors 
associated with spyware. 
Chapter IV provides a description of the basis of the experiment conducted as part 
of this work, including tool development, methodology, and implementation of 
experimental test beds.  This chapter discusses the development of VBScripts to drive 
browser applications to URLs in various Internet sectors, the manner in which the URLs 
were collected and the tools used in the detection of spyware infection. 
Chapter V provides a description of the actual experiment, a Internet web surfing 
simulation, including a step-by-step description of the experimental process.  This 
chapter also describes experiment execution anomalies, including browser crashes, 
virtual machine crashes, and script crashes.  Finally, the chapter provides a summary 
table of all the spyware detected in the various test beds on an Internet sector-per-sector 
basis. 
Chapter VI provides an in-depth analysis of the experimental data.  A detailed 
description of an attack experienced during the execution of the banking sector 
experiment is provided.  Additional detailed discussions on infections are provided for 
the insurance, real estate, and online travel sectors of the Internet.  A list of spyware-
related binary files downloaded during the course of the experiment is also provided.  
Comparisons are made among the four platforms used in the experiment and the level of 
infection observed in each of them.  Finally, the chapter provides a list of identified 
malicious web sites responsible for spyware infection. 
Chapter VII describes three related spyware studies.  The first was performed at 
the University of Washington, and consisted of network traffic analysis of the university 
network over a one-week period in 2003 in which spyware was found to have penetrated 
over 69% of the organizations within the university environment.  The second pertains to 
ongoing research performed by Microsoft in the area of spyware infection detection and 
malicious web site identification through the use of web “monkeys.”  The third study was 
conducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in which, over a period of one month, 
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600 web sites from among four different Internet sectors were manually inspected for 
malicious spyware infection.  Similarities and differences between each of these studies 
and work reported here are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter VIII provides conclusions about this research and the data 




This chapter provides general background information on various factors that 
have played a central role in the development or spread of spyware.  Additionally, some 
of the technologies used in experiments described in Chapter IV are also described in this 
chapter. 
A. INTERNET 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense 
(ARPA) supported the development of a packet switched communications network 
during the early 1960’s.  Work by researchers at MIT, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), the RAND Group, and the National Physical Laboratories 
(NPL) lead to the development of the underlying technologies needed to realize 
Licklider’s vision of the “Galactic Network” [30] and Roberts’s plan for the ARPANET 
[39].  Interest grew in the development of a national communication infrastructure 
intended to be distributed and resilient to disruption [7].  The Network Measurement 
Center at the University of California Los Angeles and the Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI) became the first and second nodes of the ARPANET in 1969, respectively.  By 
1971, approximately two dozen research and government sites were interconnected.  
Soon additional nodes followed, realizing the network of networks and experiencing 
exponential growth over the next forty years.  By 1990, the ARPANET was officially 
decommissioned by the Department of Defense, and the National Science Foundation 
took possession of the management of what became NSFNet, a network with over 
100,000 computers. 
The expansion of hypertext concepts by Nelson and Engelbart in the 1960’s, 
followed by the first email application in 1972 [54], and the World Wide Web by 
Berners-Lee in 1990 lead to the current global network consisting of hundreds of millions 
of hosts. 
B. COMPUTER NETWORKS 
The simpler computer networks, as envisioned in the 1960’s and 1970’s [30, 46], 
evolved into complex inter connected systems. These networks soon became 
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indispensable and extremely valuable assets, attracting individuals interested in 
exploiting or disrupting the technology in a variety of ways.  The following is a brief 
description of the network technologies relevant to spyware and the experiment described 
in Chapter IV. 
1. Firewalls 
The Morris Worm1 in 1988 [47] led to the realization that the Internet was no 
longer a closed community where all participants knew and trusted each other.  Although 
firewalls were in use by the late 1980’s in segmenting local area networks, by the early 
1990’s, the first security firewalls were beginning to filter packets based on rule sets.  
Firewalls were initially intended to have the following properties: function as a single 
point between two or more networks, control and authenticate traffic through the firewall 
device, and log network traffic [37]. 
Most firewalls are configured in a manner to keep malicious traffic out of a local 
area network, but not to keep the local area network traffic from reaching outside nodes.  
Generally this is a desirable property intended to maintain a degree of protection while 
maximizing access to outside resources.  Recently firewalls have added egress content 
filtering functionality and filter on specific URLs or keywords.  Such features prevent 
certain types of web sites from being visited or clear text content from being released 
outside the local area network. 
Yet firewall technology has been ineffective in preventing infection by spyware 
for reasons to be discussed in Chapter III. 
2. Network Address Translation (NAT) 
In 1994, the first RFC document describing Network Address Translation (NAT) 
was published [13].  As early as 1992, it was becoming apparent that there would be a 
shortage of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses [23].  Although IP Version 4 was capable of 
uniquely identifying 4.4 billion devices, the impending explosion in deployment of 
communication devices requiring IP addresses warranted a solution.  NAT was originally 
                                                 
1 Robert T. Morris was a student at Cornell University.  He wrote what was considered the first worm, 
a self replicating program which used various vulnerabilities to copy itself to other computers, begin 
execution of the program and search for additional computers to infect.  At the time, approximately 88,000 
computers were connected to the ARPANET and a significant portion of the network was affected. 
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envisioned as a way to “provide temporary relief while other, more complex and far-
reaching solutions are worked out.”  Over a decade later, NAT has a near-ubiquitous 
deployment throughout the Internet. 
NAT allows IP addresses to be shared across numerous devices while remaining 
mostly transparent to end-to-end protocol interaction. 
Sharing of these IP addresses is performed by translating IP address headers, in 
particular IP addresses and ports.  During transmission of packets from the inside of a 
NAT device towards the outside, the NAT device rewrites the source address in the 
packet header with a different value, and adjusts the IP and TCP header checksums 
accordingly to reflect the changes made to address fields. When a packet travels in the 
reverse direction, meaning originating outside the NAT device and destined towards a 
device located on the inside, the destination address reconstituted and the corresponding 
checksums are recalculated.  While NAT has various behavior modes, when configured 
in the symmetric mode, the translation of header information on outbound and inbound 
packets has a net effect of filtering network traffic. When translating outgoing packet 
addresses, NAT replaces the local private source address with the public source address 
and proceeds to create a temporary alias between this public address and the private 
device address.  A local session state is established in the NAT device for mapping 
between private and public addresses.  Incoming packets from public addresses are 
inspected for valid destination addresses.  If a corresponding private address and public 
address mapping is found, the packet header is modified and forwarded to the appropriate 
device.  If no such mapping is found, the packet is discarded. 
This symmetric NAT configuration filters out all inbound traffic not associated 
with an initial outbound connection.  The router used in the experiment described in 
Chapter IV was configured in this manner, intended to limit infection vectors to only 
those associated with web traffic as a result of initially visiting a specific URL.  Figure 1 
depicts such a scenario where network traffic is initiated at Host A and destined for Host 




Host B. Subsequent network traffic is allowed through based on this established binding 
while traffic originating from a different communication port or host is denied access to 
Host A. 
 
Figure 1 Symmetric NAT. From [23]. 
 
C. VIRTUAL MACHINES 
VMWare Workstation is commercially available desktop software for running 
multiple x86-based operating systems within a single physical personal computer.  The 
operating system on which VMWare Workstation runs is referred to as the Host 
Operating System while the individual images operating within VMWare are referred to 
as the Guest Operating Systems.  The guest operating systems can be configured as a 
virtual local area network or bridged to interact with the outside world.  VMWare 
achieves this by creating fully isolated virtual machines.  Each virtual machine 
encapsulates the guest operating system and all its applications.  A virtualization layer 
maps actual physical hardware resources to the virtual machine’s resources. 
VMWare software was used in the experiment described in Chapter IV. 
 
D. INTERNET BROWSERS 
With the development of HTML and the network communications infrastructure 
provided by the Internet, the stage was set for the creation of Internet browsers.  The 
roots of hypertext can be found in work performed by Vannevar Bush in 1945 [24].  
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Nelson and Engelbart further advanced the concept in the 1960’s and finally, Tim 
Berners-Lee used this groundwork to develop a standard language for screen content 
layout known as Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), and a program for displaying of 
HTML called a “browser.”2  The first widely used web browser was developed by Marc 
Andreesen and Eric Bina, with the release on NCSA Mosaic for X-Windows on Unix 
computers in 1993.  Later that year a Macintosh version was developed and by 1994, 
Spyglass Inc. was awarded commercial rights and subsequently licensed the technology 
to several companies, Microsoft among them.  In October of 1994, Netscape released the 
first beta version of its browser, known as Mozilla 0.96b.  It soon became the most 
popular browser on the Internet.  By August of 1995, Microsoft released Internet 
Explorer for Windows 95, which would overtake Netscape’s lead as the most popular 
browser by 1999. 
New features were continually added to the browser applications.  Support for 
JavaScript and Java applets was provided by Netscape in 1995.  By 1996, Internet 
Explorer provided the first truly useful implementation of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) 
and by 1997, the Document Object Model (DOM) was supported by Internet Explorer, 
thus allowing Javascript to implement dynamic content. 
Although market share numbers vary dramatically depending on the source, it is 
clear that Internet Explorer is the most popular browser with approximately 88% market 
share as of April of 2005.  On the other hand, it is estimated Mozilla’s Firefox browser 
holds approximately 6.75% of the market.  Worthy of mention however is that since 
becoming available on November 9, 2004, Firefox reported 50 million downloads by 
April 29, 2005 [16]. For these reasons, Internet Explorer and Firefox browsers were 
selected for the experiment described in Chapter IV  They represent both the most 
popular and the fastest growing browsers in use, respectively.   Figure 2 depicts a market 
share comparison among Internet Explorer, Firefox, and other non-Firefox browsers 
between June of 2004 and May of 2005. 
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Figure 2 U.S. Browser Market Share.  After [67] 
 
E. INTERNET BROWSER EXPLOITS 
The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute has been tracking the number of reported software 
vulnerabilities and computer incidents since 1988.  Figure 3 depicts trends in both 
vulnerabilities and incidents between 1988 and 2004.  Although no Internet browser-
specific statistics are reported here, the figure illustrates the state of the software industry.  
Shown in dark colored bars, is the number of vulnerabilities reported each year (x-axis), 
reported vulnerabilities in thousands along the left side (y-axis).  The number of incidents 
is shown over the same x-axis with a y-axis along the right side showing reported 
incidents in the thousands.  This figure shows a dramatic rise in both, vulnerabilities and 

















































Figure 3 Rise of Reported Vulnerabilities and Incidents.  After [5] 
 
The sections that follow will present a limited description of only a few of the 
numerous vulnerabilities discovered in Microsoft Internet Explorer.  These vulnerabilities 
are discussed here due to their relevance as a spyware infection vector during the course 
of Internet surfing activities.  While the vulnerabilities discussed apply to Microsoft 
products such as Internet Explorer, Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express, similar 
vulnerabilities have been discovered in alternative browsers such as Netscape and 
Firefox.  These vulnerabilities may give administrator or root privileges to an attacker. 
1. IFRAME and FRAME Tag Vulnerabilities 
IFRAME and FRAME tag vulnerabilities pertain to a family of vulnerabilities 
associated with the mishandling of HTML tags.  Many of the vulnerabilities associated 
with these tags are the result of improper boundary checking or error handling leading to 
buffer overflow conditions.  If a malicious web site developer generates overly long SRC 
and NAME attributes within the HTML and combines this with a specially crafted script 
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designed to prepare a heap block, Microsoft Internet Explorer can be triggered to 
dereference memory addresses which may fall within such previously prepared heap 
block.  This may cause the browser application to execute an attacker’s shell code with 
the same privileges as the current user [58].  Variant attacks may cause the browser to 
crash or misrepresent the source of a web site as reported under the status bar of the 
browser display [57]. 
2. Cross Domain Scripting Vulnerabilities 
Cross-domain vulnerabilities pertain to the manner in which Microsoft Internet 
Explorer determines the security zone of a particular browser frame [59].  Under certain 
circumstances, Internet Explorer does not correctly validate the security context of a web 
server redirected frame.  This condition can be exploited to allow a malicious script to be 
evaluated in a less restrictive security domain than it would otherwise be.  If such a 
malicious script is evaluated in the Local Machine Zone, it would execute arbitrary code 
with the same privileges as the user currently logged into the system [14, 19, 45]. 
3. Drive-by-download 
Drive-by-downloads is the term generally used for the category of computer 
programs which are able to install themselves without user authorization or awareness 
during the course of visiting a web site.  The installation of these programs is associated 
with the exploitation of IFRAME, FRAME, and cross-domain vulnerabilities in such a 
manner so as to trigger the execution of a malicious program at a victim computer.  This 
malicious program may be an installer program designed to deliver a spyware payload 
and facilitate further access to the compromised system.  IFRAME, FRAME, and cross-
domain vulnerabilities are only a few of numerous ways a browser may be forced to 
execute arbitrary code by an attacker, and are mentioned in this section for illustrative 
purposes only. 
F. WEB SEALS 
Web seals of approval or trustmarks, as they can sometimes be referred to, are a 
self-regulatory accreditation scheme initially established to promote good online 
practices.  These seals of approval were also intended to promote consumer confidence in 
e-commerce transactions and privacy on the Internet.  In September of 1999, the issue of 
Web privacy was raised at the 21st Conference of International Data Protection 
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Commissioners [66].  As a result of this, a joint project was undertaken by the Office of 
the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Ontario, Canada, and the Office of the 
Federal Privacy Commissioner of Australia.  This joint effort lead to the preparation of a 
report entitled “Web Seals: A Review of Online Privacy Programs,” presented at the 22nd 
International Conference on Privacy and Personal Data Protection on September of 2000.  
An additional study was conducted by the Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer 
Affairs E-commerce Working Party, presenting their findings report in January of 2005 
[65].  These reports evaluated such leading online privacy seals as BBBOnLine, 
developed by the United States Council of Better Business Bureaus; TRUSTe, originally 
founded by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the CommerceNet Consortium and 
funded by such companies as AOL, Intel, Microsoft, to name a few; and WebTrust, 
originally developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).  Both reports concluded 
that although security and privacy are one of the top concerns in consumer survey 
responses, consumers remain generally unaware of web seal programs.  Furthermore, it is 
concluded that the success of the web seals remains unclear. 
Therefore, when designing the experiment described in Chapter IV, web seals 
were not considered as a significantly gauge of legitimacy or trust placed on a specific 
web site. 
G. SCRIPTING LANGUAGES  
A variety of technologies have facilitated functionality by allowing programs to 
interact with one another making their methods available and thus providing services to 
applications.  Other scripting technologies offer interaction with users over the Internet, 
providing dynamic content or feature-rich experiences.  The following is a brief 
description of some of the scripting languages and mobile code mechanisms that can 
facilitate attacks.  Due to the integration of some or all of these technologies in 
commonly used browsers (e.g., Microsoft Internet Explorer, Firefox), and the wide 
spread presence of these products, a large, readily available, pool of prospective victim 
systems is vulnerable to attack. 
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1. ActiveX 
The term ActiveX pertains to a variety of technologies under what has become an 
umbrella Microsoft branding name [6].  ActiveX makes use of Microsoft’s Component 
Object Model (COM) – a packaging technology providing a group of conventions and 
supporting libraries which facilitate interaction among a variety of application 
components in a consistent and object-oriented manner.  These COM objects may be 
written in C++, Java, Visual Basic, and other languages, and are implemented as 
Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) or executable files.  COM objects expose their methods 
to other applications via vtable interfaces, as in the case of C++ written clients, or via 
dispatch interfaces, as in the case of clients written in Visual Basic or other simpler 
languages.  The later approach to exposing component methods became known as 
“automation,” a technology used in the development of an experiment described in 
Chapter IV. 
A subset of these technologies became known as ActiveX controls, those 
components intended for desktop use, using automation, and implemented as DLLs.  
Therefore, ActiveX controls cannot be directly executed but, instead, require a container, 
such as a scripting language or an application like a web browser – i.e., Internet Explorer.  
Part of the allure of ActiveX controls is that it allows the development of applications in a 
manner similar to the assembly of electronics – through pre-built component parts, while 
maintaining the ability to easily download and execute these components over a network.  
ActiveX controls may be invoked remotely and are thus considered mobile code. 
Unlike Java, ActiveX does not execute inside a “sandbox” protected environment.  
Instead, ActiveX code is native code executing directly on a physical machine.  As such, 
it is able to access services and resources not generally made available to code running in 
a restricted environment [38].  Additionally, ActiveX controls do not require registration 
on a user-per-user basis in each computer but instead need only be registered once under 
any local user account and are then available to all user accounts in a computer.  This 
may begin to explain the presence of malicious software across user accounts in a single 
computer system. 
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Microsoft developed a code signing feature for ActiveX controls.  However, code 
signing simply provides verification that the control was in-fact produced by the signer 
and that it has not been modified.  Code signing does not ensure the behavior of the code, 
its benevolence, trustworthiness or the competence of the author.  This signing process 
simply binds the code to the author without necessarily providing increased confidence in 
the code.  Additionally, Microsoft provides very little flexibility regarding the manner 
this code may be executed.  It either may be forbidden to execute in a system, or it may 
be granted full access.  This coarse-grained security approach leaves users in a position 
where functionality and security are directly opposing one another.  When ActiveX 
controls are allowed to execute, they usually execute with the same privileges as the 
current user.  Since these controls may be remotely invoked, a network channel is readily 
available for an attacker. 
One final comment regarding ActiveX code signing is that since there is no 
assurance as to the correctness of the code, vulnerabilities in signed code may be 
exploited by attackers.  The “repurposing” of “legitimately signed” code by means of 
scripting provides exploitation opportunities while hiding behind the perceived trust 
associated with a script’s signature. 
It is worth noting that ActiveX technology is now used by a variety of third-party 
applications.  Therefore, vulnerabilities and exploitation opportunities provided by 
ActiveX may not be limited within the realm of Microsoft Internet Explorer, Microsoft 
Outlook, or Microsoft Outlook Express, but instead may open the door to a system via 
many other infection vectors. 
2. Java 
Java is both an object-oriented programming language and a platform.  Originally 
developed by James Gosling and colleagues at Sun Microsystems, it was designed from 
the ground up to emphasize portability and security.  It is both a compiled and an 
interpreted language.  Java code is compiled once on any platform containing a Java 
compiler, and it is interpreted each time the program is executed on any hardware 
platform containing a Java interpreter.  A Java interpreter consists of a Java Virtual  
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Machine providing a layer between hardware and software, thus giving rise to the 
concept of the secure Java “sandbox.”  The sandbox prevents misbehaving or malicious 
code from damaging the system. 
The Java security sandbox consists of three main components – the Byte Code 
Verifier, the Applet Class Loader, and the Security Manager.  The Byte Code Verifier 
ensures that the byte code to be executed complies with the predefined set of rules, that 
the format is correct, and that pointers and access restrictions are consistent.  The Applet 
Class Loader ensures that Java classes can be added to a running Java environment.  
Finally, the Security Manager performs run-time checks on dangerous methods and 
grants higher privileges to built-in classes as opposed to remotely loaded classes. 
As with ActiveX, Java has also been found to be exploitable in both Sun 
Microsystems’s and Microsoft’s implementations of Java Virtual Machines [55, 60]. 
3. JavaScript and JScript 
Javascript is a computer language unrelated to the Java computer language.  It 
was designed for Internet browsers and intended to allow the generation of small scripts 
to be imbedded inside HTML [17].  Javascript is an object-based interpreted language 
which supports event-driven programming.  It has access to the browser DOM and is 
limited to executing within the browser application. However, Microsoft’s 
implementation of Javascript, called Jscript, is able to execute outside browser 
applications by using the Windows Scripting Host environment.  This allows JScript to 
directly access the file system, hard drives and printers, unlike Javascript.  The Javascript 
language is used to improve the web surfing experience of users by providing simple 
animations, validation of forms, redirection of browsers, display of pop-up messages and 
detection of browsers and plug-ins, allowing customization of web sites to individual 
visiting users.  The JScript language is primarily devoted to the execution of 
administrative-related scripts assisting with repetitive tasks as in the case of configuring 
desktops, managing the Windows file system and system resources, and administering 
user accounts. 
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Malicious web sites can use Javascript to launch attacks involving other 
technologies such as ActiveX.  A combination of these technologies can grant full control 
of a compromised system to an attacker. 
4. VBScript 
VBScript is a scripting language closely related to Visual Basic and Visual Basic 
for Applications, and developed by Microsoft.  VBScript operates within the Windows 
Scripting Host (WSH) and can be used as a stand-alone scripting language in system 
administration tasks or interact with such applications as browsers via the 32-bit and 16-
bit Windows Application Programming Interface (API).  The WSH creates an 
environment in which compliant scripts may execute.  WSH is built into Microsoft 
Windows operating systems beginning with Windows 98. 
VBScript can be executed as a client-side or a server-side scripting language used 
in the development of active content web sites.  It is the default language for Active 
Server Pages (ASP), a Microsoft technology which allows dynamic content generation in 
web sites. 
As with other technologies, VBScript has been used in Windows attacks, most 
famously perhaps with the creation of a VBScript worm named “The Love Bug” (also 
known as “ILOVEYOU”)3. 
H. FREEWARE IMPACT ON SPYWARE 
In 1982, Jim Knopf and Andrew Fluegelman embarked on a new software 
marketing and distribution approach.  Jim Knopf developed “Easy File,” later renamed 
PC-File, a small database application written in Applesoft BASIC.  Andrew Fluegelman 
developed “PC-Talk,” a communications program.  Both decided, initially separately, to 
include in the documentation for the software a request for donations to help support and 
defer costs associated with software distribution and maintenance.  These first two 
software programs were said to be Freeware, a term coined by Andrew Fluegelman [26].  
                                                 
3 ILOVEYOU is both a virus and a worm which, o n May 4, 2000, spread around the world in a matter 
of hours.  Over 20 government agencies and businesses such as AT&T, TWA, Ford Motor Company, 
Washington Post, ABC and others were affected causing damages ranging from $100 million to $10 billion 
[61].  
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In time the meaning of the term Freeware gave way to the term Shareware, software 
openly distributed and generally fully functional which requested voluntary donations. 
By 1987 the concept of shareware was well established with numerous programs 
being marketed in this fashion and generating millions of dollars in profits for their 
developers.  Through the years, shareware distribution transitioned from bulleting board 
systems and shareware disk vendors to CD-ROMs and, eventually to web sites which 
accepted credit card transactions. 
By the 1990’s, with the exponential growth of the Internet and increased 
connection speeds, shareware distribution expanded dramatically.  At that time, Eudora 
was one of the first email applications to become truly popular on the Internet. First 
developed by Steve Dorner in 1988, it was eventually purchased by Qualcomm in 1994.  
Eudora soon found itself loosing ground to freely distributed email clients provided by 
Netscape and Internet Explorer.  As with many other software programs, Eudora moved 
to what became know as ad-supported software distribution in an effort to maintain 
revenues.  Under this model, software developers sell advertisement space within 
application windows.  Qualcomm first announced the release of full-featured ad-
supported Eudora software in December of 1999.  This was seen as the first adoption of 
this model by a significant software developer.  Until then, smaller software developers 
had experimented with this distribution model.  Around the same time the freeware game 
“Elf Bowling” gained notoriety when it was reported to be bundled with tracking 
software, and transmitting user information to Nsoft, the game creator.  By March of 
2000, privacy concerns and difficulties uninstalling intrusive software were being voiced 
in such publications as The New York Times [20].  During this period it appears that ad-
supported software and associated tracking modules, initially developed for the purpose 
of serving up customized advertisements, became independent of those legitimate full-
featured software products.  Also in March of 2000, the technology financial markets 
reached their peak, followed by what would become known as the bursting of the “dot-
com bubble,” a period of rapid and prolonged market corrections.  These various factors 




This chapter provided a brief introduction to some of the concepts related to 
computer networks and software vulnerabilities associated with the development and 
propagation of spyware software.  Additionally, a brief explanation of the genesis of 
spyware and adware software can be found in the early development of the freeware and 
shareware software distribution concepts which, by the late 1990’s, lead to the 
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III. SPYWARE SOFTWARE 
The term “spyware” was first used to refer to small video cameras [51].  By 16 
October 1995, newsgroup forums began distributing a joke written as a C++ program in 
which the library header file spyware.h was used to partially describe Microsoft 
Corporation’s business model [70].  Subsequent postings in various newsgroups started 
using the term soon there after to describe malicious software not fitting squarely within 
the definition of a virus program.  Steve Gibson is credited with writing the first anti-
spyware program in 2000 [51] and since then, spyware has exploded into a multi-million 
dollar industry, both on the detection side as well as on the data gathering and actual 
“spying” side. 
This chapter begins by discussing some of the definitions used so far to describe 
spyware and the difficulties encountered along the way in defining spyware.  It then 
highlights reasons for that difficulty and offers an alternative definition.  The chapter also 
discusses common qualities found in spyware, infection vectors, and activities associated 
with these programs. 
A. CURRENT DEFINITIONS 
The term “Spyware” has proven particularly difficult to define over the past few 
years.  The Federal Trade Commission hosted a one-day workshop on April 19, 2004 to 
discuss issues associated with the distribution and effects of such software, which collects 
personal or organizational information and that is forwarded to another entity without the 
consumer’s knowledge or consent.  It was the intent of the FTC to better understand 
“information practices of the online marketplace and their impact on consumers” as well 
as to promote discussion of the subject among government and industry [51].  The FTC 
report acknowledged difficulties in arriving at a working definition of spyware and 
presented a brief definition provided by Steve Gibson, instead.  The report itself makes 
no new assertions as to the definition of spyware. Statements made by various panelists 
indicate the complexity and dynamic nature of software as a hindrance in the inability to 
reach an industry consensus on the definition of spyware. 
 22
At the heart of the problem has been the fact that spyware is unlike viruses, 
Trojan horses, and worms.  In fact, it can utilize all three and more at various times.  It 
can also be used for legal and illegal purposes and thus has a component of intention of 
use or deployment not present in Trojans, viruses, and worms, where malicious intent is 
clearly discernible.  In 2000, spyware was first defined as follows: 
Any software that employs a user’s internet connection in the background 
(the so-called ‘backchannel’) without their knowledge or explicit 
permission [18]. 
An alternative definition offered by Microsoft more recently is as follows: 
Spyware is a general term used for software that performs certain 
behaviors such as advertising, collecting personal information, or 
changing the configuration of your computer, generally without 
appropriately obtaining your consent [68]. 
Unfortunately, legislators and industry have become bogged down in defining 
spyware because of the fear that too broad a definition would encompass such software as 
Windows AutoUpdate and anti-virus signature update software – software with a clear 
benefit to users, and that too narrow a definition would fail to catch anything but the most 
egregious instances of spyware software. 
The definition of spyware varies greatly among security professionals.  At one 
end of the spectrum, spyware is limited to the actual collection of personally identifiable 
information, key logging, and password stealing.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
spyware has been defined as software collecting practically any information from a 
system and forwarding this to a third party in a manner unknown to the computer user.  
Examples of the latter definition would include the previously mentioned Microsoft 
AutoUpdate and anti-virus updating utilities as well as web bugs, cookies, and browsing-
habit monitoring applications.  Unfortunately, attempts to better define spyware have lead 
to an explosion of confusing terminology including such terms as snoopware, scumware, 
junkware, thiefware, parasite software, undesirable software, and others.  Since the term 
spyware is fairly well entrenched in security circles and known by the general population, 
albeit poorly defined, it will be used in reference to the whole software genus until a 
more precise definition is provided by this author. 
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1. Convergence Obstacle 
Contributing to the problem in defining spyware is the issue of converging 
technologies.  In the early days, viruses replicated code.  They evolved to replicate code 
through a variety of mediums and subsequently modified or morphed their signatures by 
changing the code being replicated.  But at their very essence, viruses simply replicate 
their code.  Computer worms are similar in nature in that they burrow through networks 
also replicating their payload or code.  Unlike viruses, worms are self contained and do 
not rely on other programs, files or documents to propagate. 
In the case of spyware, however, full-fledged applications are installed onto 
computer systems via a variety of insertion vectors.  In addition, these applications are far 
more feature and capability-rich than viruses or worms.  Yet, the very same techniques 
used for malicious purposes by spyware writers are also used by a variety of legitimate 
business, providing enhanced features to computer users.  Herein lies the conundrum, if a 
definition of spyware is to be arrived at, it cannot be solely based on activities or 
techniques used in the software but must consider intent behind its development and 
deployment. 
To illustrate the point, consider the case of the previously mentioned Microsoft 
AutoUpdate software.  This software collects or maintains information on the patch level 
of the host system and at regular intervals – when configured to do so – will connect to 
Microsoft servers and will download available patches or fixes for the operating system.  
The benefit to the user appears to be clear in this case, yet common underlying behaviors 
exist between this program and spyware programs, which also collect information and 
have the ability to download updates or additional applications onto a computer system.  
Both programs do this without necessarily informing the computer user about their 
activities, and both programs operate in the background.  The case is similar for anti-virus 
programs which contact virus signature servers at regular intervals to maintain an up-to-
date virus definition file. 
At its essence, the convergence obstacle in defining spyware can be summarized 
in that legitimate and illegitimate, and desirable and undesirable software programs 
utilize the same common set of activities.  These activities consist of the ability to operate 
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in the background, collect information, communicate this information to a third party, 
and maintain a presence in a computer system.  These are discussed later in this chapter 
as spyware’s four basic activities – hide, collect, communicate, and survive.  It is the 
convergence of technologies possessing these four activities that lead to software 
packages assembled to compromise networks and hosts, in the form of spyware.  These 
software packages may contain virus, worm, and Trojan horse-like qualities or behaviors. 
2. A Note on Confinement 
An interesting consideration when discussing the spyware problem is that it 
largely derives from the inability of a discretionary access control system to address the 
confinement problem [28].  Since spyware is able to operate within the same access 
rights as the user, a key logger, for example, is able to intercept keystrokes destined to a 
specific application and make them available to other programs.  Mandatory access 
control was developed to address the confinement problem, but, covert-channels not 
withstanding, as commercial systems have not incorporated multilevel security to date, 
spyware may use many impersonation and Trojan horse techniques to exfiltrate 
information or steal resources.  For example hijacking of bandwidth-rich applications 
such as Internet browsers allows spyware to communicate through firewalls, even when 
these are configured with egress filtering of applications or ports.  Stateful firewalls are 
not sufficient in containing outbound fleeing information.  By performing packet payload 
analysis, however, it may be possible to contain a subset of outbound information – as 
long as it is not encrypted. 
It is this leakage of information with general impunity that is of concern not only 
to privacy advocates but also in relation to corporate trade secrets and national security. 
B. SPYWARE BASIC ACTIVITIES 
Spyware modus operandi consists of four basic activities which are common to 
all.  From these four basic activities, spyware extends numerous both legal and illegal 
capabilities.  These activities are described as follows: 
 25
1. Hide 
Spyware software must be able to hide, at least in part, the mechanisms associated 
with its installation, execution, data collection, or communication.  In legitimate 
programs, “hiding” can be seen as the desirable aspect of staying out of the user’s way. 
Installer programs and execution of such programs may be hidden by the 
exploitation of various system vulnerabilities.  Chapter VI discusses just such an event in 
which spyware is surreptitiously installed onto an experiment test bed. 
The name of the program may be chosen to hide its presence.  It may appear to be 
an operating system process or service.  More advanced techniques allow spyware 
processes and services to be invisible to process and service reporting applications, thus 
fitting the definition of “rootkits.” 
Data collection may be hidden by encrypting files, storing the data temporarily in 
alternate data streams (e.g., in Windows NTFS file systems), or in unallocated sectors of 
the hard drive.  Data and spyware code may also be hidden by the use of random file 
names in folders known to contain thousands of files, such as system or browser cache 
directories, thus hiding in a crowd.  Data or actual code may also be stored and hidden 
inside the Windows system registry [29]. 
Finally, spyware communications may be hidden by encrypting the transmission, 
by performing sparse, limited transmissions, or by compromising a legitimate application 
which possesses Internet access, and transmitting via such application (e.g., Internet web 
browsers). 
2. Collect 
Spyware must also be able to collect information.  This information may be in the 
form of non-identifiable market demographics, personally-identifiable demographics, and 








Communication and sharing of collected information is vital to spyware.  
Communication channels may include high speed wired and wireless network 
connections such as Ethernet, wireless 802.11, and Bluetooth technologies, as well as 
dial-up modem connections. 
4. Survive 
The last basic activity of spyware is its ability to survive.  Spyware resides in a 
hostile environment.  Implicit in the desire to remain undetected is the consequence that 
when detected, users will act to remove it.  There is a high likelihood attempts will be 
made to remove or disable the spyware software at some time during the deployment and 
maintenance phase of its lifecycle.  Therefore, spyware must be resilient to remain within 
the compromised system for as long as possible. 
This resiliency may be accomplished through a variety of techniques, some of 
which are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.  First, several mechanisms used 
to start spyware on the user’s computer are described.  Resiliency to removal may include 
utilizing multiple startup mechanisms so that if one is removed, others may be used. 
a. Start-up Folders 
Start-up folders are special folders in Windows systems where a user may 
place program or document shortcuts.  The content of these folders is executed during the 
boot-up process.  The following is a list of folders containing this characteristic: 
Windows 95/98/ME: 
%windows directory%\Main menu\Programs\StartUp\ 
%windows directory%\All Users\Main menu\Programs\StartUp\ 
Windows 2000/XP: 
\\Documents and Settings\[user name]\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ 
\\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ 
Additionally, these folders are declared inside the Windows registry.  By 
modifying the entries in the following two registry keys, a malicious user could place 
spyware in a hidden folder anywhere in the system and have it execute every time the 
system is booted. 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders 
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b. Autorun Registry Keys 
The Windows operating system registry possesses numerous ways to start 
programs during the boot-up, login, logoff, and shutdown process. Spyware can modify 
these registry keys to include a path to its installer or launcher program, thus allowing it 
to reinstall itself or remain active in a system.  New autorun registry keys are still being 
discovered even by Microsoft itself.  According to [64], 34 different registry keys could 
be used to start programs and an additional 17 previously unknown registry keys were 
discovered during the course of their experiments.  The following is a limited list of some 











c. Services or Daemons 
Window services or Unix daemons can be used to launch spyware or 
maintain control over a compromised system.  This allows for spyware to be executed 
prior to the user logon process and conceivably prior to execution of spyware 
countermeasures. 
d. Autoexec.bat and Initialization files 
Legacy files no longer used by Windows XP can be exploited to launch 
spyware in older systems like Windows 95/98/ME/NT.  These files may include 
config.sys, autoexec.bat, win.ini, system.ini, wininit.ini, and config.sys.  Load and Run 
commands in some of these files allow the indiscriminate execution of programs. 
e. Browser Helper Objects (BHO) 
Browser Helper Objects extend the functionality of Internet Explorer by 
adding in-process Component Object Model (COM) components to the browser so that 
each time the browser starts, it exhibits this newly gained functionality.  Spyware writers  
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have made use of BHO to launch and attach spyware to the browser application and since 
BHO have full access to the browser COM, spyware gains Internet access by 
impersonating the browser. 
f. Interlocks 
Software interlocks are mechanisms which restrict the actions that can be 
taken on a specific program.  For example, in the case of spyware, interlocks are used to 
monitor the state or presence of the various processes or dynamic link libraries associated 
with its normal operation.  If any one of these components is shutdown by a user, the 
remaining components detect the action and respond accordingly.  This technique 
prevents users from manually disabling or removing spyware. 
g. Hooks 
In Microsoft Windows operating systems, system hooks are defined as 
functions which intercept system messages, mouse actions, or keystrokes destined to a 
specific application.  The function intercepting these events may choose to forward them 
along to the corresponding application, discard them, or execute any operation it wishes 
based on this triggering event.  This allows spyware writers to intercept system calls or 
actions which may attempt to reset settings previously modified by spyware or, which 
may attempt to modify or remove the spyware program itself. 
C. ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION 
Spyware borrows many qualities from already clearly defined and well 
understood malicious software such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses and backdoors.  
Similarly to the words used by Supreme Court Justice Stewart when considering a 
definition for hard-core pornography, “I know it when I see it” [56], “I know it when I 
experience it” appears to apply well in recognizing spyware.  However, this does not 
suffice, and thus the following are considered in forming a better definition of spyware: 
1. Development Intent 
The intent behind the development or use of the software and the manner in which 
it is deployed is worthy of consideration.  However, even though the software was 
developed for commercial and legal purposes, the key here is whether or not it is 
designed to monitor or steal resources from users.  Therefore, software developed with 
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 the express purpose of gathering information on a user, and obtaining demographic 
information (personally identifiable or not) or targeted specific information, should be 
considered spyware. 
It is conceivable that as in the case of cookies and web bugs, which can be 
misused to achieve spyware-like results, programs not initially designed as spyware could 
also be misused to provide user information.  Such programs would therefore not be 
considered spyware unless they also meet further criteria. 
2. Profit Intent 
The remote party must intend to use the information for financial gain through 
either legal or illegal means, or for strategic advantage as in the case of national security 
concerns. 
3. Evidence of Basic Four Activities 
The presence of the four basic activities of spyware – hide, collect, communicate, 
and survive – is a strong factor in labeling a program as spyware. 
These four basic activities obviously may vary in emphasis among programs, 
changing the focus of the application according to the emphasis placed by the developer 
on each of these four basic activities.  For example, applications with a low emphasis in 
the collection and communication of data may be likely to fall within a pop-up or general 
adverting server category.  Conversely, a program with a high emphasis in collection and 
communication of data would be likely considered a system monitor such as a screen 
capturing device or a key logger application.  Finally, an application with a high 
emphasis on hiding, communication and survivability, and low emphasis on data 
collection may be indicative of a resource stealing application as in the case of distributed 
computing schemes. 
Figure 4 provides an illustration of spyware uses among the marketing, 
surveillance, and resource consuming industries.  While spyware may be implemented by 
software or hardware, the following discussion is limited to the software implementation.  
Spyware is divided into three main areas of use – marketing, surveillance, and resource 
consumer-related activities.  For the purposes of this discussion, the marketing area is 
defined as any business making use of demographic information whether it is anonymous 
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or directly identifiable to a user, and used strictly for the purpose of selling a legitimate 
product or service.  The surveillance category is defined as having as its main objective 
the tracking of users or gathering user information in a far greater degree of detail than 
the marketing category.  Its main use is in law enforcement, industry asset and employee 
monitoring, or intelligence gathering activities.  Resource consumers are defined as those 
who financially benefit from utilizing system resources in compromised systems. 
 
Figure 4 Spyware Uses and Mechanisms 
 
Based on these definitions, adware and behavioral-based advertising (both of 
which may include pop-up advertising type behavior), and browser hijackers fall within 
the marketing category.  They draw traffic to affiliated web sites and attempt to generate 
business transactions. 
In the case of the surveillance category, screen capture devices, key loggers, 




Browser Helper Objects and Layered Service Providers are able to intercept web traffic 
before it is encrypted by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), thus further expanding surveillance 
capabilities. 
Resource consumers is the category of spyware designed to profit from 
distributed computing by taking system resources away from the user.  For example, 
remailers utilize bandwidth-rich DSL-connected systems to distribute spam.  Another yet 
more egregious instance utilizes unused storage or CPU cycles in a compromised system 
and sells them to clients with massive processing or storage requirements. 
In summary, spyware is a computer program that is either (1) developed with the 
express purpose to steal resources or collect user or organization data, or (2) deployed 
with the intent to profit financially or strategically from data collected, and must have 
four common activities.  These four activities are: hide, collect, communicate, and 
survive in a hostile environment.  Of course, spyware of type 1 may exhibit one or more 
of these four activities as well.   
The mechanics of spyware activities are as follows.  Spyware hides by using 
deceptive or surreptitious techniques.  Spyware collects system, organizational, or 
personal data.  Spyware communicates collected data to a remote or third party.  Spyware 
is designed with a degree of resilience, remaining present in a system as long as possible. 
The extent of the information collected, and program activities or capabilities, are 
diminished or hidden from the user through deception or obfuscation. 
Tracking of users may be accomplished without relying on the local execution of 
a specific program, as is the case with cookies and web bugs.  Cookies and web bugs in 
and of themselves are unable to track users on the Internet.  But when the same cookie or 
web bug is used by numerous affiliated web sites, or within numerous web sites in the 
same domain, patterns emerge allowing companies to closely watch user activities.  
Therefore, cookies and web bug technologies are in a sense, abused to provide a much 
greater degree of detailed information about a user than perhaps was initially intended.  
Additionally, cookies and web bugs are not considered spyware here because they lack 
the four basic activities present in spyware software. 
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D. SPYWARE CAPABILITIES 
Spyware capabilities extend from the four basic activities observed among them.  
Figure 5shows three main capabilities observed in spyware. 
 
 
Figure 5 Spyware Behavior. 
 
All spyware capabilities can be classified as being either passive (collection) or 
active (modification and larceny).  Passive spyware consists of strictly monitoring 
software which communicates gathered data back to a third party.  Such programs do not 
interfere with user activities and may go mostly undetected in a compromised system.  
Active spyware consists of programs with the logic or ability to detect specific events and 
act or react based on a specific criteria.  Based on the degree of aggressiveness, such 
programs announce their presence in a compromised system by removing control of the 
system from the user, as in the instance of browser hijackers.  For example, in the most 
benign instance, mistyping a URL at a hijacked web browser may redirect the application 
to an unintended spyware-affiliated web site.  Alternatively, the visiting of specific web 
sites may trigger a pop-up or HTML injection of competing business advertisements.  In 
the most egregious instances, a Browser Helper Object and key logger software was 
configured to monitor internet activity. When an unsuspecting user visited anyone of 50 
banking institutions, the program would intercept POST and GET commands prior to 
their encryption and would, in turn, forward them to a Russian web server [1]. 
1. Setting Modification 
A subset of spyware programs has the ability of changing system settings, 
including Internet browser application settings or system wide security settings.  The 
programs may be called browser hijackers in their most benign form or malware in their 
most egregious instance.  Browser hijackers will generally change the various settings 
associated with the default homepage, search page, and error page brought up by a 
browser.  More menacing changes may include the lowering of security settings and 
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addition of malicious or spyware-affiliated web sites into the browser or software firewall 
Trusted Zone (e.g., Microsoft Internet Explorer and ZoneAlarm). 
Spyware may also undermine the security posture of a system be either exposing 
the system to a new set of vulnerabilities present in the spyware program itself or by 
actively sabotaging and disabling the operation of defensive measures such as software 
firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-spyware programs.  Such actions may include the 
temporary or permanent disabling of security-associated services and processes shutting 
down applications, the modification of the host file preventing anti-virus and autoupdate 
applications from obtaining the latest signature files from company servers, and the 
altering of the transport service provider by writing a winsock2 layered service provider 
(LSP) over the TCP/IP protocol stack [22].  LSPs implement higher-level custom 
communication functions, allowing malicious programs to monitor all communications 
associated with the browser application.  As an LSP, spyware is able to intercept 
communications before they are encrypted and sent via Secure Socket Layer (SSL), thus 
exposing sensitive or confidential information.  
2. Data Collection 
Spyware collects three main kinds of information – anonymous demographic 
data, personally identifiable demographic data, and targeted data. 
Data is forwarded to data repositories which can lead to simple market 
demographic analysis associated with advertisement serving, or may be associated with 
identification theft, corporate espionage, or classified government materials being 
disclosed.  Spyware data collection can also lead to the use of system resources which 
can further serve as a launch pad for distributed Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks or the 
creation of BotNets – armies of compromised systems remotely controlled, and acting in 
unison, by a malicious user. 
a. Anonymous Demographic Data 
Anonymous demographic data is comprised of client information such as 
files downloaded, browser type, screen resolution, colors displayed, plug-ins available, 
search queries, time spent at a particular web site, referrer web site, and the next web site 
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 to be visited.  It is generally limited to web surfing habits, but may also include user 
demographics when available.  Such demographic information may include sex, age, zip 
code, marital status, dependents, and more. 
b. Personal Demographic Data 
Personal demographic data is comprised of names, telephone numbers, 
addresses, IP addresses, system serial numbers, behavior patterns or any other 
information leading to the direct identification of the user. 
c. Targeted Data 
Targeted data is a special category for data collection in that this area is 
considered to be strictly associated with malicious or intelligence gathering activities.  At 
the user level, targeted data may include the active searching or compromising of 
passwords, social security numbers, credit card numbers, and financial or medical 
information.  At the corporate or national level, targeted information includes specific 
corporate trade secrets, contract and project information or industrial process 
specifications, and information of a specific classification or topic relevant to national 
security. 
3. Resource Larceny 
Resource larceny pertains to those spyware programs designed to profit or benefit 
from using the computer resources of compromised systems.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, the author does not consider resource larceny those spyware programs which 
consume excessive amounts of computer resources as a result of their monitoring or 
advertising serving activities but instead instances where the spyware perpetrator directly 
profits from the use of compromised system resources.  Altnet is an excellent example of 
such a program [48].  Altnet was distributed as a companion program with Kazaa Media 
Desktop.  The program was created by Brilliant Digital Entertainment (BDE), a company 
specifically selling storage and processing power based on a distributed storage and 
computing business model.  A good illustration of what BDE had in mind can be found in 






You hereby grant BDE the right to access and use the unused computing 
power and storage space on your computer/s and/or internet access or 
bandwidth for the aggregation of content and use in distributed computing.  
The user acknowledges and authorizes this use without the right of 
compensation.  Notwithstanding the above, in the event usage of your 
computer is initiated by a party other than you, BDE will grant you the 
ability to deny access [48]. 
This is considered an example of resource larceny spyware because, although 
BDE states users will be given the ability to deny access to system resources, the 
statement is buried in a combined EULA.  Furthermore, display of EULA statements is 
often made extremely difficult as documented by Benjamin Edelman [12].  In this case, 
Kazaa’s EULA is 5,936 words long and displayed over fifty-six pages.  Additionally, 
bold face, line breaks, heading styles, or other distinguishing techniques are purposefully 
omitted to blend text in confusing and obfuscating ways preventing a clear understanding 
of what the user is agreeing to. 
Such applications are considered storage sinks if their primary role is to consume 
storage space, and they are considered CPU cycle sinks if their main objective is to 
consume processing power.  Spam remailers are considered to mainly target bandwith 
and are thus considered bandwidth sinks, with CPU processing consumption as a 
secondary objective. 
E. INFECTION VECTORS 
Spyware infection comprises four main vectors – deception, bundled software, 
exploits, and inadequate security settings.  Following is a detailed description of each of 
these vectors: 
1. Deception 
Deception is used extensively by spyware in attempting to gain control of a 
computer system.  Social engineering and psychology play a role in enticing 
unsuspecting users to download or activate a program thus triggering the infection of the 
system.  This is generally accomplished via pop-up windows or advertisements, some 
made to look like operating system error windows, requesting the user to accept the 
installation of “required” software to view or enter a web site.  Others still offer purported 
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anti-virus or anti-spyware scanners, some “freely distributed” to remove phony detection 
alerts.  Even if a user declines an offer or closes a window, installation takes place 
nevertheless. 
Another practice when addressing bundled software is the hiding of overly 
permissive EULAs in the EULAs of other applications in the bundle.  It is common to see 
EULAs extending for thousands of words, spread over tens of pages, viewable only via a 
small application window, effectively hiding their intentions [12]. 
2. Bundled Software 
As indicated above, spyware relies heavily on freeware and shareware for 
distribution.  Programs such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing Kazaa or the WeatherBug 
– spyware which provides weather reports – are instances in which spyware programs are 
bundled with desirable applications which do not explicitly inform the user of the 
exchange of information to be taking place. 
In this respect, these bundles are Trojan horses :in the absence of true, clear, and 
upfront disclosure of the functionality of the software bundle, many of these programs 
purport to do one thing but in fact, do much more than that, opening communication 
channels to a third party which in-turn, may install additional programs or take control of 
system resources. 
3. Exploits 
Spyware makes extensive use of known and zero-day exploits to gain access to a 
system.  As shown in detail in the experiment discussed in chapter IV and V, spyware is 
able to exploit vulnerabilities present in Internet browsers to gain access to computer 
system.  Figure 6 shows the anatomy of a spyware drive-by-download attack.  Beginning 
with a user conducting web surfing activities, if a malicious web site is encountered, a 
triggering event is raised.  This triggering event may consist of a script exploit used to 
download and install a mini-installer program.  Small in size, the mini-installer can go 
mostly undetected while controlling the speed of spyware installation, thus preventing 
over consumption of resources and prematurely revealing its presence to the user.  Once 
the mini-installer is executed, it may gain control of the system or it may contact other 
servers from where it may download the remaining spyware components or additional 
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affiliate programs.  From this point forward, and with complete control of the system, 
spyware will monitor its health and may take actions to prevent removal from the system.  
Once it is firmly ingrained in the system, monitoring of user activities or collection of 
data begins.  Infection by spyware may also lead to remote access by malicious users. 
4. Inadequate Security Settings 
The drive-by-download attack can be accomplished through configuration 
vulnerabilities as well as vulnerability “exploits.”  For example, Internet browsers 
configured to arbitrarily grant access to all scripting and trust all sources are likely to be 
fertile ground for spyware infection. 
 
 




This chapter discussed some of the definitions given to spyware and the 
difficulties in arriving to a consensus working definition.  Four basic spyware activities 
are discussed in this chapter: hide, collect, communicate, and survive.  This chapter also 
proposed a concise spyware definition based on three main area considerations  – the 
development intent, profitability intent, and the presence of the four basic spyware 
activities. 
A discussion of spyware activities was provided from the perspective of passive 
versus active.  Additionally, spyware activities are categorized as performing setting 
modifications, data collection, or resource larceny.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of infection vectors and offers a description of a exploit drive-by-download 
infection. 
The following chapter describes the test bed configuration for an experiment in 
which various sectors of the Internet were evaluated for infection of spyware via drive-
by-download techniques. 
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IV. EXPERIMENT TOOL DEVELOPMENT 
The following chapter describes an experiment designed to assess the potential for 
spyware infection through drive-by-download techniques in patched and unpatched 
Windows XP systems through the use of Internet Explorer and Firefox browsers.  A 
description of the experiment methodology, test bed, choice of tools used in the 
experiment, scripts generated to conduct the experiment, selected Internet sectors, and 
browser configurations are discussed in this chapter. 
A. METHODOLOGY  
This experiment was designed to determine whether the practice of relatively 
“safe” web surfing to mainstream, popular web sites can lead to infection of computer 
systems by spyware.  Specifically, the empirical analysis investigates the extent to which 
drive-by-download techniques and browser vulnerabilities result in the surreptitious 
installation of software in the system. 
Although there are various web seal or trustmark programs attempting to provide 
a level of legitimacy and trust in web sites (i.e., TRUSTe, BBBOnLine, and others), such 
programs have not played a vital role in user activities or behavior when surfing on the 
Internet [65].  Therefore, for the purposes of this experiment, web sites displaying such 
web seals were not specifically targeted to satisfy the definition of “safe.”  Instead, the 
term “safe” is used from the perspective of an internet user conducting surfing activities 
while not specifically seeking high risk web sites from such sectors of the Internet as 
hacker or warez, adult entertainment, or online gambling-related web sites.  Furthermore, 
our definition of safe web sites includes those sites a user would encounter simply by 
visiting the top or most popular hits in different topic areas as provided by a search 
engine (e.g., Google™).  Additionally, the definition of safe web surfing activities does 
not include interaction with the individual homepages by clicking on banner ads or popup 
advertisements, except when necessary to dismiss the popup window by closing the 
window, or responding with a “Cancel” or “No” response.  Therefore, “safe” web sites 
consist of relative mainstream popular internet destinations that are outside high risk 
sectors of the Internet. 
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One exception to the manner in which web sites were selected pertains to web 
sites developed for children.  The American Library Association (ALA) compiles a list of 
web sites under their “Great Web Sites Seal of Approval” program [2].  These web sites 
are reviewed by librarians and deemed to be suitable web sites for children.  The ALA 
defines children as those persons under the age of 14.  The seal of approval criteria is 
based on authorship and sponsorship, purpose, design and stability, and content.  Privacy 
and security are not considerations when granting this seal of approval.  The presence of 
ALA seal of approval was used to develop the list of child-related web sites for inclusion 
in this experiment.  
For comparison purposes, high risk sectors of the Internet were also included in 
this experiment. 
The experiment can be broken down into the following tasks: 
• Accumulate a list of web sites for each of eight safe and three unsafe 
sectors of the Internet. 
• Visit each web site with four different web browser applications – two 
different browsers under a default unpatched Windows XP installation, 
and two browsers under a fully patched Windows XP installation. 
• Collect system snapshot data. 
• Data Analysis  
• Detection of infection for the Internet sector. 
• Identification of malicious web site responsible for infection 
Execution of the experiment is accomplished by a collection of Visual Basic 
Scripts (VBScripts).  These scripts drive browser applications to visit the various Internet 
sector Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) and idle for five seconds to allow spyware 
infections to take place, and proceed to collect system snapshots prior to visiting the next 
URL.  These system snapshots are later compared against baseline conditions.  The 
scripts are described in greater detail in Chapter IV Section D of this report.  Internet 
browser applications were used to visit the various web sites and to permit a level of 
vulnerability to malicious web site attacks that a general internet user would encounter.  
By using Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Mozilla’s Firefox browsers, spyware 
infection is possible as a result of the vulnerabilities present in each of the browsers. 
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Detection of infection on the workstation that hosts the browser is accomplished 
via three different techniques.  The first is through the use of a host integrity monitoring 
system.  This consists of software used in a client-server configuration which generates a 
baseline snapshot of a remote test bed file system and collects subsequent comparative 
snapshots over a defined period.  This provides information on any files or folders added, 
modified, or deleted, as well as information on changes made to user accounts, running 
services, and open communication ports.  The second technique consists of client-based 
commonly recommended anti-spyware scanning tools.  These tools are used to determine 
spyware infection at the completion of each Internet sector experiment.  The third 
technique consists of a collection of client-based third party tools used to collect system 
information after visiting each individual web site.  Information collected includes a list 
of running processes and services, open communication ports and files associated with 
such ports, a list of applications or programs scheduled to autostart upon boot-up or login, 
browser security and preference settings, a snapshot of the hosts file, a list of browser 
favorites or bookmarks, and over eighty-seven different system registry sub keys.  This 
information is compared to baseline snapshots in an effort to identify specific changes 
caused by a particular web site. 
Based on the design of the experiment, conclusions may be made on the relative 
risk factor of various Internet sectors, the use of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser 
versus Mozilla’s Firefox browser, and the state of a default configuration unpatched 
Windows XP system versus a default configuration fully patched Windows XP system. 
B. TEST BED DESCRIPTION 
The test bed is comprised of a workstation, a file server, a hub, and a router.  The 
workstation is configured with an operating system which hosts the integrity monitoring 
system and VMWare.  The VMWare environment is configured with five client operating 
systems.  The host operating system is a fully patched Windows XP system.  This system 
is comprised of an Intel Pentium 4 3.2Ghz, 2GB of Ram, and two 120GB hard drives.  
The test bed environment is protected by a Cisco 2600 router implementing Network 
Address Translation (NAT).  A Windows XP file server located on a separate computer is 
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used for the storage of data.  This same server is also used for the collection of network 
traffic during the web surfing simulation phase of the experiment. 
1. Network Topology 
For the purposes of this experiment, an unrestricted T1 Internet connection was 
established.  The Cisco 2600 router was used to protect the test bed from infection by 
means other than strictly spyware-related drive-by-download attacks.  The router was 
further connected to a four-port 3Com hub to which the file server and the Host were 
connected.  The VMWaret system hosted the five simultaneous VMWare images, each 
consisting of a separate Windows XP virtual machine.  The virtual machines consisted of 
a passive experimental control identified as hostname PASSIVE, a default unpatched 
Windows XP and Internet Explorer installation identified as IE, a default unpatched 
Windows XP and Firefox installation identified as FF, a fully patched Windows XP and 
Internet Explorer installation identified as IESEC, and a fully patched Windows XP and 
Firefox installation identified as FFSEC.  Figure 7 depicts the network topology as well 
as the IP addresses and “hostnames” assigned to each component of the experiment. 
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Figure 7 Test Bed Network Topology. 
 
a. Router Configuration 
The router was configured to implement NAT and only to accept web 
traffic on port 80, Secured Sockets Layer (SSL) traffic associated with encrypted 
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) on port 443, and Domain Name System (DNS) on 
UDP port 53.  Figure 8 provides a list of the access-list configuration as reported by the 
router when executing the “show run” command.  
 
access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq www 
access-list 101 permit udp any any eq domain 
access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq 443 
Figure 8 Cisco 2600 Router Access-list Configuration 
 
 44
2. VMWare Environment 
For the purposes of this experiment, a total of five virtual machines was created.  
All five machines consisted of Microsoft Windows XP installations logged in under the 
“Administrator” account and with the following configurations: 
a. IE Guest Operating System 
The IE Operating System was of a default installation of Microsoft 
Windows XP and Internet Explorer.  Patches or fixes were not installed either for the 
operating system or for the Internet browser.  No security enhancements were made or 
configuration settings modified.  While it is recognized that this configuration is 
obviously exposed to attacks, it remains, nevertheless, the default out-of-the-box 
configuration of the operating system and thus, it is representative of systems 
encountered on the Internet and used by less-than-savvy computer users around the 
world. 
b. IESEC Guest Operating System 
The IESEC Operating System also consisted of a default installation of 
Microsoft Windows XP and Internet Explorer.  However, unlike the IE configuration, 
this platform was fully patched with all Microsoft-available patches as of July 2005.  A 
complete list of the installed patches is included in Appendix D.  The configuration 
included Service Pack 2 and subsequent patches installed via the AutoUpdate feature 
included in Windows XP.  Additionally, the software firewall included with Windows XP 
was allowed to remain enabled. 
c. FF Guest Operating System 
The FF Operating System is similar to the IE configuration with the 
exception that the default browser is set for Mozilla’s Firefox 1.0.4. 
d. FFSEC Guest Operating System 
The FFSEC Operating System is similar to the IESEC configuration with 
the exception that the default browser is set for Mozilla’s Firefox 1.0.4.  No additional 
security updates were installed for the browser as there were none available at the time of 
the experiment. 
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e. PASSIVE Guest Operating System 
The PASSIVE configuration consisted of an idle IE configuration.  The 
virtual machine was simply allowed to remain active in the virtual network, but did not 
actively navigate to any web site.  The intent of this virtual machine was to document any 
possible infection of the test bed by means other than the web surfing simulation. 
For each of the above systems, a deviation from a simplistic default 
installation of Windows XP was, however, the inclusion of common third party 
applications associated with the enhancement of the web surfing experience.  
Macromedia’s Shockwave plug-in software has reported 390 million downloads, and 
Macromedia’s Flash Player is present in over 98% of internet-enabled desktops [32].  
These applications are commonly found in Windows XP systems.  To this purpose, all 
Windows XP Operating System installations were configured with the following 
applications: 
• Sun JAVA Runtime Environment (Java 5.0 Update 4 jre-1_5_0_04-
windows-i586-p-iftw.exe). 
• Macromedia Shockwave Player 10.1.0.11.  
• Macromedia Flash Player 7.0. 
• Google™ Toolbar:  This software was installed expressly for the sole 
purpose of limiting the number of unwelcome popup advertisements 
encountered in some sectors of the Internet.  Although it is conceivable 
drive-by-download attacks may be launched from popup windows, this 
experiment intends to document infection as a result of visiting 
homepages.  The Google™ Toolbar was only installed in the IE platform 
due to the fact that pre-Service Pack 2 Internet Explorer installations do 
not include a popup blocker feature.  This popup blocker software 
prevents new windows from displaying advertisings which can interfere 
with the ability to view a website of interest.  It should be noted, however, 
that the software was not completely successful in preventing all popups 
as advertisers utilize several different techniques.  Additionally, once 
infection has taken place via a drive-by-download or vulnerability, and a 
third party application has been installed, the popup blocker software is 
unable to prevent further advertisements.  All other features other than the 
popup blocking feature of the Google™ Toolbar were disabled for the 




3. File Server 
The file server consisted of a Windows XP system located outside the VMWare 
virtual network environment.  The computer was fully patched and configured to share a 
folder on the network for storage of data.  The folder was further configured to allow 
only the creation of files but prevent the deletion of files or folders.  Storage of data was 
placed under separate folders for each of the test bed platforms. Thus, the IE platform 
stored its data in the C:\Repository\IE folder and so on. 
The system also contained an installation of the open source network traffic 
analyzer Ethereal and its accompanying command-line utility Tethereal.  Tethereal was 
used during the course of the experiment to collect network traffic.  All traffic was 
captured and stored in libpcap format files for possible subsequent analysis.  Capture 
filters were used to limit the collection of network traffic only to those five virtual 
machines located in the virtual network and using either port 80 or port 443. 
C. CHOICE OF TOOLS 
During the course of the experiment, various previously developed tools were 
utilized to gather system state information to determine if infection of the guest operating 
system virtual machines had taken place, and if so, which web site was responsible for 
the infection.  The tools used in this experiment were selected based on their free 
availability and popularity within the IT community, and the fact that most of them have 
command-line support facilitating scripting. 
1. Anti-spyware Scanners 
Four different anti-spyware scanners were used in this experiment, each of which 
is freely available:  Microsoft’s AntiSpyware (Beta 1), Lavasoft’s Ad-Aware, Spybot 
Search and Destroy, and Earthlink’s SpyAudit.  Each of the tools generates a text or html 
formatted report.  First, these scanners were used to document clean, uninfected test bed 
baseline conditions.  These reports were stored and compared against subsequent 
scanning reports.  Second, following the conclusion of a test run, i.e., successful 
execution of all 500 URLs associated with a given Internet sector, the scanners were used 
a second time to detect spyware infection as a result of web surfing activities within a 
specific sector.  The use of these scanners only documented the presence of spyware but 
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did not assist in identifying the web site responsible for the infection.  VBScripts and 
third party command-line tools were used to collect system snapshot information and 
analyze it to identify malicious web site URLs.  Sample outputs generated by some of 
these third party command-line tools are provided later in this section. 
a. Microsoft AntiSpyware 
For this experiment, Microsoft AntiSpyware version 1.0.614 and 
definition file 5729 dated June 27, 2005, was used.  The software conducts an extensive 
scan of registry keys, memory running processes, and the file system. 
b. Lavasoft Ad-Aware 
Ad-aware SE is an adware and spyware scanning program.  According to 
Lavasoft’s product web site, “Ad-aware conducts a comprehensive scan of memory, 
registry, hard drive, removable and optical drives for known data mining, aggressive 
advertising, parasites, scumware, selected traditional Trojans, dialers, malware, browser 
hijackers, and tracking components.”  For this experiment, Ad-Aware SE version 1.06R1 
and definition file SE1R51 21.06.2005, was used. 
c. Spybot Search and Destroy 
Spybot Search and Destroy version 1.4 and definition file 2005.06.24 were 
used for this experiment.  The product web site states that Spybot Search and Destroy 
identifies adware, browser helper objects (BHO), browser hijackers, dialers, key loggers, 
malware, spyware, Trojan horses, and worms. 
d. Earthlink Online Spyware Scanner 
Earthlink offers a scanning tool at their web site [11].  For this experiment, 
SpyAudit version 4.0.0.2 with digital signatures dated June 3, 2005, was used.  This tool 
provides a limited fast scan of registry keys, key directories and browser hijackers, and 
reports on adware, Trojan horses, system monitors and adware related cookies found in 
the system.  
 
2. SysInternals Utilities 
SysInternals LLC maintains a suite of advanced utilities for system administrators 
and security researchers [40].  A limited version of many of these utilities is available 
free of charge.  For this experiment, several were used. 
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a. Autoruns v8.0 
This utility collects information on programs configured to execute during 
the system boot-up and login process, as well as in such areas in the registry as the Run 
and RunOnce sub keys [41].  Additionally, it enumerates any programs listed in the 
system startup folder, an area in Windows systems where programs may be launched 
during the startup process.  This tool was invoked after each URL and used to 
complement information gathered by reg.exe.  A review of the various startup parameters 
analyzed by this tool assisted in the development of a more complete tool created in 
VBScript.  Scripts used as part of this experiment are discussed later in this section.  
Figure 9 provides sample output generated by Autoruns.exe.  In this instance, the tool 
identified osirisd.exe and vmwareservice.exe as services scheduled to run in this 
computer. The first reported service is associated with the host integrity monitoring 
system while the second service is associated with the VMWare image environment.  
Subsequent registry keys are listed but not reported to contain any entries. 
C:\tools>autorunsc -a -w –s -e -d -m –p 
Autoruns v8.00 - Autostart program viewer 
Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Mark Russinovich and Bryce Cogswell 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com 
 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services 
   osirisd 
 c:\windows\system32\osirisd.exe 
   VMTools 
 Provides support for synchronizing objects between the host and guest 
operating systems. 
 VMware, Inc. 





HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components 






Figure 9 Sample Output for Autorunsc.Exe Tool. 
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b. PSService v2.13 
PSservice generates a list of services currently running in a Windows 
system [43].  The list includes such information as the status of the service, configuration, 
and dependencies.  This tool was used after visiting each URL and the report is compared 
against baseline conditions.  Figure 10 shows sample output generated by this tool.  In 
this instance, the tool reported two separate services, providing the name and description 
associated with each of them as well as the current status, along with other information. 
C:\tools>psservice   
   
PsService v2.12 - local and remote services viewer/controller 
Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Mark Russinovich 




Notifies selected users and computers of administrative alerts. If the 
service is stopped, programs that use administrative alerts will not 
receive them. If this service is disabled, any services that explicitly 
depend on it will fail to start. 
 TYPE    : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS  
 STATE    : 1  STOPPED 
          (NOT_STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN) 
 WIN32_EXIT_CODE   : 1077 (0x435) 
 SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0  (0x0) 
 CHECKPOINT   : 0x0 
 WAIT_HINT   : 0x0 
 
SERVICE_NAME: ALG 
DISPLAY_NAME: Application Layer Gateway Service 
Provides support for 3rd party protocol plug-ins for Internet 
Connection Sharing and the Internet Connection Firewall 
 TYPE    : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS  
 STATE    : 1  STOPPED 
          (NOT_STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN) 
 WIN32_EXIT_CODE   : 1077 (0x435) 
 SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0  (0x0) 
 CHECKPOINT   : 0x0 
Figure 10 Sample Output for Psservice Tool. 
 
c. TCPView v2.4 
TCPView generates a list of all TCP and UDP endpoints and state of TCP 
connections in a system [44]. Additionally, this utility can also report the name of a 
process that owns a particular endpoint.  TCPvcon, a command-line version of TCPView, 
was used in conjunction with Netstat after each visited URL and current conditions were 
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compared against the baseline.  Figure 11 shows sample output generated by tcpvcon.  In 
this instance, several TCP and UDP ports are listed in various states, and the process and 




TCPView v2.34 - TCP/UDP endpoint lister 
Copyright (C) 1998-2003 Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com 
 
[TCP] System 
      PID:     4 
      State:   LISTENING 
      Local:   FF:microsoft-ds 
      Remote:  FF:0 
[TCP] C:\WINDOWS\System32\osirisd.exe 
      PID:     1536 
      State:   LISTENING 
      Local:   FF:2265 
      Remote:  FF:0 
[TCP] System 
      PID:     4 
      State:   ESTABLISHED 
      Local:   ff:1041 
      Remote:  lanai:netbios-ssn 
[UDP] C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe 
      PID:     876 
      Local:   FF:epmap 
      Remote:  *:* 
[UDP] System 
      PID:     4 
      Local:   FF:microsoft                                           
Figure 11 Sample Output for Tcpvcon Tool. 
 
d. Handle v3.1 
Handle provides a list of open handles maintained by processes in a 
Windows system, a list of files, directories, or objects associated with running programs 
[42].  This tool was used after each visited URL and the results were compared against 
the baseline to detect any suspicious process behavior.  Figure 12 shows sample output 
generated by Handle.  In this instance, it shows three separate processes, smss.exe, 
csrss.exe, and handle.exe, respectively.  Each process is reported as having various files 
or sections associated with it.  Additionally, the tool also reports the PID and account 






Copyright (C) 1997-2004 Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
smss.exe pid: 552 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
    8: File          C:\WINDOWS 
   1c: File          C:\WINDOWS\system32 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
csrss.exe pid: 616 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
    c: File          C:\WINDOWS\system32 
   40: Section       \NLS\NlsSectionUnicode 
   44: Section       \NLS\NlsSectionLocale 
   48: Section       \NLS\NlsSectionCType 
   4c: Section       \NLS\NlsSectionSortkey 
   50: Section       \NLS\NlsSectionSortTbls 
  3b0: File          C:\WINDOWS\system32\ega.cpi 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
handle.exe pid: 708 FF\Administrator 
    c: File          C:\Tools                                           
Figure 12 Sample Output for Handle.Exe Tool. 
 
e. Bginfo v4.07 
Bginfo is used to display system information on the desktop background 
for the purpose of easy identification of the test bed currently being worked on [9].  
Information displayed by Bginfo included hostname, IP address, subnet address, among 
others. 
3. Microsoft Utilities 
Microsoft includes a variety of system administration tools with each of its 
operating systems.  This experiment utilized the following tools: 
a. Reg v3.0 
This tool allows command-line interaction with the system registry files 
by providing support for querying, adding, deleting, copying, saving, restoring, loading, 
unloading, comparing, exporting, and importing registry keys [33].  Reg.exe was used for 
backing up registry keys prior to the commencement of the experiment and for restoring 
them to baseline conditions following each visited URL.  It was also utilized for the 
querying of registry values following each visited URL, creating a text file containing a 
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report of registry keys and values.  This text file was stored at the remote file server and 
subsequently compared against baseline conditions. 
b. TaskList.exe 
This tool provides a list of active processes and services running in a 
computer [34].  Reports generated after each visited URL were compared against 
baseline conditions that existed prior to the commencement of the experiment.  Figure 13 
shows a list of processes, associated PIDs, and services. 
C:\tools>tasklist /SVC /FO TABLE 
 
Image Name  PID  Services 
============================================================== 
System Idle Process 0 N/A                                      
System   4 N/A                                       
smss.exe  552 N/A                                           
csrss.exe  616 N/A                                           
winlogon.exe 640 N/A                                           
services.exe 692 Eventlog, PlugPlay                            
lsass.exe  704 PolicyAgent, ProtectedStorage, SamSs          
svchost.exe  876 RpcSs                                         
svchost.exe  968 AudioSrv, Browser, CryptSvc, Dhcp, dmserver,  
    ERSvc, EventSystem, helpsvc, lanmanserver,    
    lanmanworkstation, Messenger, Netman, Nla,    
    Schedule, seclogon, SENS, ShellHWDetection,   
    srservice, TermService, Themes, TrkWks,       
    uploadmgr, W32Time, winmgmt, WmdmPmSp,        
    wuauserv, WZCSVC                              
spoolsv.exe  1268 Spooler                                       
osirisd.exe  1536 osirisd                                       
VMwareService.exe 1584 VMTools                                       
explorer.exe 1880 N/A                                           
cscript.exe  508 N/A                                           
tasklist.exe 1112 N/A                                           
Figure 13 Sample Output for Tasklist.Exe Tool. 
 
c. Netstat.exe 
Netstat.exe provides command-line access to TCP/IP statistics and active 
connections.  Netstat was used after each visited URL for the purpose of determining 
whether any new connections or listening ports were established.  These reports were 
compared against baseline conditions captured at the commencement of the experiment.  
Figure 14 shows sample output generated with netstat.  In this instance, various local 








  Proto  Local Address  Foreign Address State  PID 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:135  0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 876 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:445  0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 4 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:1025  0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 968 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:2265  0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 1536 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:5000  0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 1168 
  TCP    10.10.10.35:139 0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 4 
  TCP    10.10.10.35:1041 0.0.0.0:0  LISTENING 4 
  TCP    10.10.10.35:1041 10.10.10.100:139 ESTABLISHED 4 
  UDP    0.0.0.0:135  *:*     876 
  UDP    0.0.0.0:445  *:*     4 
  UDP    0.0.0.0:500  *:*     704 
  UDP    0.0.0.0:1027  *:*     1136 
  UDP    0.0.0.0:1030  *:*     968 
  UDP    10.10.10.35:123 *:*     968 
Figure 14 Sample Output for Netstat.Exe Tool. 
 
4. Osiris Host Integrity Monitoring 
Osiris Host Integrity Monitoring system is a freely available host tool that can be 
used to monitor changes in a computer system or network of hosts by taking regular 
snapshots of the file system as well as of user lists, group lists, open ports, running 
services, and other parameters [71].  Subsequent scans of these systems are compared 
against a baseline.  Osiris was used to establish baselines for each of the test beds prior to 
the commencement of the experiment and subsequent scans were performed following 
the completion of each Internet sector experiment. 
5. Ethereal Network Protocol Analyzer 
Ethereal is a freely available network protocol analyzer generally used in 
troubleshooting network traffic [15].  For the purposes of this experiment, Ethereal V. 
0.10.11 was installed in the file server.  Traffic was collected with Tethereal, a non-
graphical utility provided with Ethereal, and stored in libpcap formatted files for possible 
further analysis.  
Figure 15 depicts the location of both the Osiris Host Integrity Monitoring system 


















Figure 15 Osiris Host Integrity Monitoring System and Ethereal System Location 
within the Network. 
 
D. SCRIPTS 
The experiment was controlled by five main VBScript scripts tasked with the 
invoking of Internet browsers and collection of data.  Additional VBScripts were used to 
support converting, parsing, and formatting text files generated during the course of the 
experiment.  VBScript is a subset of Microsoft’s Visual Basic and it is interpreted by the 
Windows Scripting Host (WSH) which is included with Windows XP.  Thus, one of the 
benefits taken into consideration in the selection of a scripting tool set was the 
complexity of software installation in each of the test beds.  Other scripting languages 
such as Perl or Python would require a separate interpreter installation in each of the test 
beds, so VBScript was chosen.  Additionally, VBScript provides built-in support for 
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Component Object Model (COM) Automation which was used by the scripts to access 
Internet Explorer objects.  One last factor contributing to the selection of VBScript over 
another scripting language was its readability.  Although wordy, VBScripts are easy to 
read and can be understood by novice and experienced programmers alike. 
The first and second scripts were browser “drivers,” one for Internet Explorer and 
one for Firefox.  The scripts, intuitively named ie.vbs and firefox.vbs, create an instance 
of the browser and opens a text file from which URLs are fetched, passing them to the 
browser navigation function.  Five seconds of idle time is allowed to the browser prior to 
the collection of system snapshots.  The selection of a window of time prior to collection 
of the system snapshot was based on empirical analysis of malicious web sites.  Refer to 
Chapter 4 Section E for a detailed discussion on this topic.  Various system snapshot 
parameters were then collected over the next thirty to sixty seconds (time intervals varied 
based on system CPU utilization). 
The driver scripts make an attempt to dismiss browser windows requiring 
attention by either sending Alt-N keystrokes to handle “No” responses, {ESC} to dismiss 
the window, or Alt-C to reply with a “Cancel” response.  This addressed web sites that 
requested to install software or make the visiting web site the default homepage for the 
browser.  Therefore, when offered an option, the scripts would decline to install software 
or change settings, thus attempting to take a safe web surfing approach. 
The driver scripts accepted three parameters consisting of the platform being 
tested (i.e., IE, IESEC, FF, or FFSEC), the Internet sector being tested (i.e., Government, 
Banks, Online Travel, etc), and a third optional parameter used to restart the script from a 
particular URL.  This third parameter was added to the script to handle instances in which 
the browser crashed, possibly as a result of malicious web site activities.  For those 
instances when the browser crashed, the scripts invoked themselves passing the URL at 
which it crashed as its third parameter, thus allowing the test run to continue.  The driver 
scripts invoke three other scripts: registry.vbs, collector.vbs, and miner.vbs, in turn.  A 
URL access log record of the URL and corresponding access time was sent both to the 
screen and to a text file at the remote file server. 
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Script registry.vbs collected registry keys pertinent to modifications in browser 
settings or registry keys associated with the starting of files, services or processes upon 
boot-up, login, or other triggering events.  Eighty-seven different registry keys were 
queried using reg.exe.  Values obtained from these queries were stored in a text file at the 
file server, which would later be compared against baseline snapshots.  Additionally, the 
script enumerates files in the browser cookies folder, Internet Explorer Favorites folder, 
and Administrator and All Users startup folders.  It was, therefore, possible to detect 
start-up and browser configurations changes by a specific web site by comparing 
information collected by this script against baseline conditions.  Prior to navigating to the 
next URL in the list, the script would reset the registry and folder content to baseline 
conditions.  A list of the eighty-seven registry keys is provided in Appendix B. 
Script collector.vbs collected host file information for Internet Explorer platforms, 
and host file, cookies, bookmarks, and preferences for Firefox platforms.  The script read 
the files and performed a difference comparison against baseline files. If a difference was 
noted, the file was copied to the file server and the original baseline file replaced the 
changed file, resetting the system to its initial conditions. 
The miner.vbs script executed six different third party tools consisting of 
autorunsc.exe, handles.exe, tasklist.exe, tcpvcon.exe, netstat.exe, and psservice.exe.  
Each of these tools generated output which was redirected to separate text files in the 
remote file server for later comparison against baseline conditions.  These reports 
provided comprehensive information on programs scheduled to start upon boot-up, login, 
or other triggering events, files and folders associated with running processes, a list of 
running processes and services, and open TCP and UDP communication ports. 






























Figure 16 Analysis Process 
 
Additional scripts were prepared for handling various administrative tasks 
associated with the formatting and preparation of links for input into the experiment, and 
formatting and processing of data files.  Such scripts are considered peripheral to the 
experiment itself and administrative in nature so no further discussion is included in this 
work. 
E. INFECTION VALIDATION 
In designing the experiment, preliminary tests were performed to determine if 
infection of the test bed using the proposed methodology was in fact possible.  For this 
purpose, the IE test bed was sent to five known malicious web sites, since it was the least 
secure and most basic of the two Windows XP platforms.  Figure 17 shows a sample 
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screen capture of the download times associated for web site “www.unix-time-
format.dzwonki.pruszkow.pl.”  This web site URL was obtained in the same manner as 
URLs obtained for the various sectors of the experiment (Described in Chapter IV 
Section F).  Table 1 shows a comparison of download times for three of the five different 
malicious web sites.  Two of these web sites accomplished the installation of spyware by 
crashing the web browser, thus halting the script and the timer.  Therefore, no download 
timing data is available for these two web sites.  Additionally, Table 1 also includes the 
time it took to collect the system state snapshots.  Increased CPU activity associated with 
the installation and execution of spyware is reflected in these time intervals – reported as 
“total collection time.”  Observations from this limited evaluation of malicious web sites 
lead to the configuration of the ie.vbs script with a 15-second timeout and a 5-second idle 
parameters, respectively.  If the web site took longer than 15 seconds to download, the 
browser would be directed to the next URL in the list of URLs compiled for such Internet 
sector.  The 5-second idle parameter causes the browser to wait a minimum of 5 seconds 
after the web site has been downloaded prior to starting the collection of system state 
snapshots.  Based on this limited evaluation of malicious web sites, a 5-second idle 
parameter was considered adequate to allow infection of the test bed.  In fact, the 
crashing of the browser in two of the five malicious web sites evaluated occurred within 
ten seconds of arrival to the specific web site, well within the 5-second idle and 15-




INFECTION_TEST # 1:Initiating Experiment at 8/6/2005 2:00:31 PM 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Count Access Time  Download Status URL Visited 
1 8/6/2005 2:00:46 PM  1 www.unix-time-
format.dzwonki.pruszkow.pl 
 
End Time: 8/6/2005 2:01:09 PM 
Total Run Time (h:m:s): 0:1:38 
Started Download at t1 seconds after 12:00am:  50431.52 
Ended Downloading at t2 seconds after 12:00am:  50446.67 
Total Time to download web page (seconds):  15.15625 
Idle time starts at t1 seconds after 12:00am:  50446.67 
Idle time ended at t2 seconds after 12:00am:  50451.67 
Total Idle time (seconds):     5 
 
Started Collection of system state 20.15625 seconds after arriving to 
the page 
Started Collection at t1 seconds after 12:00am:  50451.67 
Ended Collection at t2 seconds after 12:00am:  50468.73 
Total Collection time (seconds):    17.0625 
Figure 17 Malicious Web Site Download Time Evaluation. 
 
 








15.1 17.1 Drive-By-Download 
Viking-supply-
net.to.opole.pl 
N/A N/A Browser crashed 
Food-pyramid.ok.opole.pl N/A N/A Browser crashed 
Sex-archive.biz/movies/ 9.5 38.1 Drive-By-Download 




To document infection by each of these malicious web sites, the test bed was 
examined with each of the four previously described anti-spyware tools.  Table 2 
provides the number of individual spyware artifices identified by each of the tools.  
Numbers in parenthesis represent the number of separate signatures associated with the 
spyware artifice. 
 
Table 2 Preliminary Malicious Web Site Infection Comparisons 








5 9 (99) 11 (41) 10 (259) 
Viking-supply-net.to.opole.pl 3 7 (63) 6 (20) 7 (130) 
Food-pyramid.ok.opole.pl 3 7 (65) 6 (20) 7 (130) 
Sex-archive.biz/movies/ 3 9 (100) 11 (41) 10 (242) 
m.cpa4.org/reality 1 3 (26) 2 (2) 1 (4) 
 
F. URL DETERMINATION 
The experiment is intended to assess generally “safe” sectors of the Internet. To 
that end, links associated with banking, insurance, children, real estate, online travel, 
universities, government, and military-related web sites were evaluated.  Additionally, 
high risk areas of the Internet were also evaluated for comparison purposes.  These high 
risk areas are particularly prolific on the Internet and enjoy a great deal of traffic and 
interest.  These sectors included online gambling, hacker and warez, and adult 
entertainment-related web sites.  Where feasible or clearly identifiable, the links were 
pruned to the homepages of each domain by the use of regular expression scripts, 
explained in further detail later in this section. 
A list of banking institution-related web sites was obtained from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which maintains a list of member banks.  This 
source provided good-quality banking-related web sites in the sense that all links where 
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truly associated with banks.  A total of 7308 links were obtained but due to time 
constraints, 500 web sites were selected at random. 
A list of child-related web sites was obtained in part from the American Library 
Association and their Great Web Sites Seal of Approval Program. Additional links were 
obtained at other minor child-related directories.  A total of 500 links where compiled in 
this group. 
University-related links were compiled from the University of Texas at Austin 
which maintains an alphabetical list of all U.S. community colleges and universities.  The 
links to the individual institution web sites are provided in this listing.  A total of 2135 
links were obtained, from which 500 were selected at random. 
Government and military-related web sites were compiled using the Google™ 
search engine.  Searches were conducted by filtering for the .gov or .mil domains.  A total 
of 500 links were collected for the government sector of the Internet, and 350 distinct 
web sites were collected for the military sector of the Internet.  Here, a government-
related web site is defined to be web sites hosted by a federal or state government agency.  
A military-related web site is defined to be a web site hosted by a military-related agency 
or branch, in the .mil domain. 
Insurance-related web sites are web sites that discuss or provide insurance 
services, brokers, training classes, or insurance associations.  Real estate-related web sites 
are web sites that discuss or provide real estate related services as well as Internet-related 
real estate, as is the case with web hosting services.  Online gambling-related web sites 
are web sites that provide or discuss gambling activities.  Online travel-related web sites 
are web sites that sell travel packages, make reservations, provide information on travel 
destinations, or discuss or provide services to the travel industry, as in the case of training 
schools or certifications and associations. 
Web sites for the remaining sectors of the Internet used in this experiment were 
compiled by conducting search engine queries for specific key words. For example, when 
compiling the online gambling sector of the Internet, the search query consisted of 
keywords “online gambling” or “online casino.”  When compiling real estate-related web 
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sites, search queries included keywords such as “real estate realtor mortgage 
homepages.”  In this manner, 500 links were collected for each of the insurance, online 
travel, and real estate-related sectors of the Internet.  Only 418 web sites were compiled 
for the adult entertainment sector, 346 web sites were compiled for hacker and warez-
related sectors, and 392 web sites were compiled for the online gambling sector, 
respectively.  Table 3 provides a list of queries used in compiling links for the various 
Internet sectors as well as the number of web sites tested under each sector. 
Table 3 Link Source Or Search Query String 
Sector Sector Size
(urls) 
Search query or source 
Safe Sectors 
Banks  501* Source: www.fdic.gov  
Children 500 Source: www.ala.org 
Government 500 Homepage site:.gov 
Insurance 500 Source: www.ultimateinsurancelinks.com 
Military 350 Homepage site:.mil 
Online Travel 500 online travel reservations “travel agent” 
Real Estate 500 Real estate realtor mortgage homepages  
Mortgage company homepages 
Universities 500 Source: www.utexas.edu/world/univ/state/ 
Unsafe Sectors 
Adult Entertainment 418 Free porn XXX 
Hacker / Warez 346 Cracks exploits virus Trojans download –
infosec –zdnet –cnet –site:.mil,_.gov 
Online Gambling 392 online gambling, online casino 
* An additional web site in excess of the 500 intended for this sector was 
mistakenly included in the test sequence.  All 501 URLs are bank-related web sites 
obtained from FDIC. 
Due to the nature of search engine algorithms and heuristics, queries may yield 
different results over time.  Thus, the above referenced queries may not yield the exact 
same links used in this experiment. 
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Two scripts were used to filter out the links from html pages, remove duplicates, 
and format the links in a manner appropriate for the experiment.  The links were sorted 
alphabetically and Google™ related links were removed.  Using regular expressions, a 
script was written to trim URLs to the domain level.  In VBScript, the matching 
expression was crafted as follows: 
Re.Pattern = “\S+(\.\w+)+\.[a-z]{2,3}” 
This expression begins by matching one or more non-white space characters 
followed by one or more combinations of a dot and one or more word characters, 
followed by a dot and two or three letters.  The intent for the application of this filter was 
to remove duplicate URLs and broaden the number of different domains visited during 
the course of the experiment.  It was not the intent of this experiment to visit multiple 
web sites hosted under the same domain but target the homepages for each of the 
domains. 
Unlike the government, military, and university domains which are .gov, .mil, and 
.edu, respectively, the remaining sectors of the Internet are located under a variety of 
domains such as .org, .net. .com, etc.  There is, however, a problem with the quality of 
the links obtained through this method.  There were instances in which unrelated links to 
the Internet sector were presented by the search engine.  This introduced a degree of 
“noise” into the accuracy of the links.  While it was unfeasible to confirm that each link 
was, in fact, related to the target sector, efforts were made to filter out obviously 
unrelated links.  Evaluations of the number of false links present in each of these Internet 
sectors is discussed in Chapter VI. 
It is worth noting that since the intent was to simulate activities by a casual 
Internet user, it is reasonable to expect unrelated web sites to be encountered during a 
specific topic query.  Such unrelated web sites may lead to infection by spyware. 
G. BROWSER CONFIGURATIONS 
Two different internet browsers were selected for this experiment.  Microsoft 
Internet Explorer and Mozilla’s Firefox represent both the most popular and prevalent 
browser in use and the fastest rising browser in growth of use, respectively. 
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1. Microsoft Internet Explorer  
Internet Explorer version 6.0.2600.0000.xpclient.010817-1148 was used in the IE 
platform while version 6.0.2900.2980.xpsp_sp2_gdr.050301-1519 was used in IESEC, 
respectively.  The browser was generally left in its default configuration with the 
exception of changes from a default of “prompt” to a setting of “enabled” or “allowed” 
for a limited number of categories. Table 4 provides a list of deviations from default 
configurations under the Internet Zone [10] and the Advanced Settings configuration 
tabs: 
 
Table 4 Microsoft Internet Explorer Deviations From Default 
Configuration  
Categories Default Setting Test Bed Setting 
Internet Zone Tab 
Download signed ActiveX 
controls Prompt Enable 
Font download Enabled Disabled 
Display Mixed Content Prompt Enabled 
Installation of Desktop 
Items Prompt Enabled 
Launching Programs and 
Files in an IFRAME Prompt Enabled 
Submit Nonencrypted 
Form Data Prompt Enabled 
Advanced Settings Tab 
Automatically check for 
Internet Explorer Updates 
Enabled Disabled 
Enable Install on Demand 
(Internet Explorer) 
Enabled Disabled 
Notify when Download 
Complete 
Enabled Disabled 
Warn if Changing Between 
Secure and Unsecure Mode 
Enabled Disabled 
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All cookies were blocked, as tracking cookies was not the focus of this 
experiment.  For a complete list of all browser settings, please refer to Appendix E 
2. Mozilla Firefox 
Mozilla Firefox version 1.0.4 was used in this experiment. The only modification 
made to the default installation of Firefox was the destination of downloaded files.  A 
copy of the preferences file pref.js is included in Appendix E. 
H. SUMMARY 
This experiment was designed to detect infection of the test bed as a result of 
drive-by-download techniques when visiting web sites.  By collecting system state 
snapshots via a combination of VBScripts and third party tools, it is possible to discern 
the infecting web site and the spyware installed in the test bed.  Additionally, by utilizing 
Internet Explorer and Firefox browsers in unpatched and patched default configurations – 
as an out-of-the-box installation of Windows XP and, after applying Microsoft Service 
Pack 2 and subsequent patches – it is possible to assess the efficacy of these patches. 
In the following chapter, a discussion of the web surfing simulation utilizing the 
setup described in this chapter is provided, including a description of the effects observed 
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V. INTERNET WEB SURFING SIMULATION 
This chapter describes the execution of the experiment to determine if infection 
by spyware through drive-by-download techniques is present in various main-stream 
sectors of the Internet. It starts with the collection of URLs, and progresses to web 
surfing simulation, collection of data, and subsequent detection process.  This chapter 
also discusses some characteristic spyware symptoms observed in the infected test beds.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS 
Collection of Internet sector URLs was conducted between the third and fourth 
week of June 2005.  VMWare test bed images were also created during this same period.  
The test bed images were equipped with the appropriate scripts and Internet sector URL 
files in a “Tools” directory, which was created off the C Drive.  Additionally, third party 
tools were placed in this same directory and anti-spyware scanning software was installed 
and configured to “scan mode” only.  The file server “repository” folder was mapped in 
each of the test beds to drive letter “S.” 
Following the configuration of the test beds, each of the four anti-spyware 
scanning tools was used, starting with the least intrusive – Earthlink’s SpyAudit.  An 
html report documenting the “clean” state of the system was saved on the test bed 
desktop as well as in a baseline folder located at the remote file server.  LavaSoft’s Ad-
Aware, Spybot Search and Destroy, and Microsoft Anti-Spyware were used in this order, 
with the most comprehensive scanning settings selected.  Scan text reports for each of 
these tools were stored at the baseline folder of the remote file server.   All five test beds 
were found not to contain spyware. 
Once each of the test beds was configured and scanned for spyware, Osiris was 
used to establish a baseline report of the file system, user accounts, running services, and 
open ports.  These reports were stored in the Host system (Refer to Figure 7).  
Additionally, miner.vbs, registry.vbs, and collection.vbs scripts were executed, collecting 
a baseline snapshot of system conditions prior to the commencement of the experiment.  
Files generated by these scripts were also saved in the baseline folder for later 
comparison. 
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URLs associated with the Internet sector to be tested were copied from a text file 
in a sub-directory to c:\tools\urls.txt.  It is this file which is used by the web browser 
driving scripts to fetch test URLs.  
The browser driving script – either ie.vbs or firefox.vbs depending on the test bed 
– was executed, allowing the web surfing simulation to commence.  Upon execution, a 
web browser window was instantiated and navigation to the web sites began, logging 
access times to a command-line window and to a text file at the remote file server.  A 
total of eight report files are generated per visited URL.  The files were named in the 
following manner: 
 
[url number][Internet Sector][Tool].txt 
 
 The first parameter consists of the number of the URL being accessed, based on 
its row number within the c:\tools\urls.txt file.  This number can be directly correlated to 
the full URL for each web site.  The second parameter consists of the Internet sector 
being tested (i.e., banks, universities, online travel, etc).  The third parameter consists of 
the tool generating the report or the type of data being generated – AutoRuns.exe, 
Handles.exe, Netstate.exe, ProcessList, Reg.exe, Service.exe, TCP, and Negative Diff 
Report.  This last file parameter provided information on whether the host file had 
changed with respect to the baseline copy of the same file.  The host file is located at 
c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\host.  For test beds configured with the Firefox browser, 
additional information on whether the preferences file “pref.js,” and the bookmarks file 
“bookmarks.html” had changed when compared to baselines. 
A total of 4,000 text files is generated for a 500-URL Internet sector in a given 
test bed.  Therefore, given that four test beds are used for actively surfing the Internet, 
16,000 files were created per Internet sector.  The PASSIVE test bed virtual machine 
does not actively surf the internet as it is used as a passive control.  Therefore, this test 
bed did not generate any text file reports.  Web surfing simulations and data collection 
took place between July 6 and July 24, 2005.  When possible, all four test bed platforms 
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and the passive control test bed were executed simultaneously.  However, due to 
differences in browser download times, CPU utilization, internet bandwidth, and server 
performance, the four test beds would fall out of synchronization with one another.  This 
behavior leads to differences in web site access times between just a few seconds to a few 
hours.  Additionally, the time required to test all 500 URLs in a given sector ranged from 
approximately seven to nine hours, given no catastrophic anomalies such as virtual 
machine crashes. 
Upon conclusion of each Internet sector experiment, the test bed was scanned 
with Osiris to determine any changes in the file system, user accounts, processes and 
services, and communication ports.  Reports indicating differences noted between this 
scan and baseline conditions were generated and stored in the Host machine.  Osiris 
reports for test beds exhibiting spyware infection are included in Appendix C. A limited 
number of these reports showed administrative changes made to the test bed image 
between the establishment of the baseline and the completion of the test bed experiment.  
Administrative changes included the replacement or upgrading of scripts as 
improvements were implemented.  Additionally, as URL text files were gathered and 
added to the test bed images, Osiris reports reflected their inclusion or modification.  For 
these reasons, such changes are not the result of spyware activity and have therefore been 
edited out from the reports included in the Appendices in the interest of brevity and 
relevance. 
Following the completion of each sector’s experiment and the test bed Osiris 
scan, each of the anti-spyware scanning tools was invoked in the same order as described 
previously in this chapter.  Reports generated by these tools were stored in the remote file 
server for later analysis.  The virtual machine images were then powered down through 




1. Experiment Execution Anomalies 
During the course of the experiment, three main anomalies were experienced: 
a. Browser Crashes 
Based on preliminary tests conducted during the development of the 
browser driving scripts, it was noted the browser application would crash in certain 
instances.  As described in Chapter IV, the driving scripts were created with the ability to 
re-invoke themselves with a third optional parameter containing the URL number being 
accessed at the time of the crash.  This would allow the script to restart, with a new 
instantiation of the browser application, at the next URL in the list of URLs for that 
sector. 
b. VMWare Test Bed Image Crashes 
In a few instances, the VMWare image itself crashed, shutting off a given 
test bed, and thus the operating system, browser application, and scripts executing within 
it.  Although conclusive reasons for the cause of these crashes was not determined, it is 
strongly suspected power saving settings in the host machine under which all five virtual 
machines were located, may have contributed to the virtual machine instability.  Once 
these settings were changed, the frequency of these crashes decreased dramatically. 
However, the crashing of the test bed image did not affect the data 
collected by the experiment since this data was stored at the remote server.  Analysis of 
the test bed image further revealed that improper shutoff of the image did not affect 
changes made on the image file as a result of spyware infection.  The virtual machine test 
bed image files were configured to be persistent, meaning that changes made to the image 
file would be written immediately and permanently to the virtual hard disk.  Additionally, 
upon experiencing the first crash of the test bed image, anti-spyware scanning tools were 
used to determine if any infection of the test bed had been lost as a result of the untimely 
and unexpected end of the test bed experiment.  It was found that the test bed image had 
indeed been infected by spyware, a change from initial baseline conditions.  The physical 
computer hosting the virtual machine was unaffected by the test bed crash. 
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c. Script Crashes  
Browser scripts were also noted to crash, thus halting the experiment.  
This type of crash occurred when a particular web site presented the script with a modal 
window – a child window created by a parent application which had to be closed prior to 
granting control back to the parent application.  If such modal windows could not be 
dismissed by a combination of {Alt-F4}, {ESC}, {Alt-N}, or {Alt-C} keys sent to the 
application interface, the experiment would halt.  Encounters of such modal windows 
were rare and limited to web sites associated with the distrusted sectors of the Internet. 
B. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A detailed discussion of infection data and analysis is provided in Chapter VI.  
However, the following is a high level description of infection symptoms observed 
during the course of the experiment. 
Depending on the Internet sector being tested, various degrees of disruption were 
observed during the course of the experiment.  For Internet sectors such as banks, 
government, military, and universities, few additional windows other than the one 
instantiated by the test script, were observed.  Additionally, browser crashes were rarely 
noted. On the other hand, while testing such Internet sectors as real estate and online 
travel, and certainly those sectors associated with high risk areas of the Internet such as 
hacker or warez and adult entertainment-related web sites, increased instances of 
unhandled popup advertisements and browser crashes were noted.  Not coincidently, 
these same Internet sectors exhibited a high degree of spyware infection.  One 
explanation for the presence of unhandled popup advertisements and browser crashes in 
these test beds is that once a test bed has been infected by spyware, popup blocking 
features offered by either Google™ Toolbar or Windows XP Service Pack 2 become 
ineffective.  Furthermore, the type of popup advertisement associated with this 
undesirable software is generally aggressive in nature in the sense that they are designed 
to be highly persistent and have maximal exposure on a system in an attempt to gain full 
attention by users. 
Specific spyware software was observed to be generally common across the 
various Internet sectors found to have been infected.  Table 5 shows a list of all spyware 
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software identified by the anti-spyware scanning tools.  The table indicates both the test 
bed platform and the Internet sector the software was found in.  It was immediately 
obvious that Mozilla’s Firefox browser was not infected by any of the Internet sectors 
tested. 
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Table 5 Spyware Found Across the Tested Internet Sectors by Test Bed 
Spyware / Adware Internet Sector 










180search Assistant      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Adintelligence.AproposTo
olbar 
         IE, IESEC  
Admilli Service      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
AlwaysUpdateNews 
Spyware 
         IE, IESEC  
AprosMedia          IE, IESEC  
AutoProxy Trojan      IE, IESEC IE     
AvenueMedia.DyFuCA 
Browser Plug-in 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Bargain Buddy          IE, IESEC  
BookedSpace Browser 
Plug-in 
     IE, IESEC IE     
ClearSearch Browser 
Modifier 
     IE, IESEC IE     
ClimaxBucks      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
CoolWebSearch Browser 
Modifier 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
DealHelper          IE, IESEC  
EffectiveBandToolbar IE   IE        
Exact.BullseyeNetwork          IE, IESEC  
Exact.CashBack Adware          IE, IESEC  
Exact.Downloader Trojan 
Downloader 
         IE, IESEC  
Exact.SearchBar Browser 
Plug-in 
         IE, IESEC  
Hijacker.TopConverting      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
IBIS Toolbar         IE, IESEC   
IEPlugin Spyware      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Internet Optimizer      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
ISearchTech.SideFind      IE, IESEC IE  IE IE, IESEC  
IST.ISTBar Browser          IESEC  
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Spyware / Adware Internet Sector 













         IE, IESEC  
IST.ISTbar.ContentMatch
Control Browser Plug-in 
         IE, IESEC  
IST.SlotchBar Toolbar          IE, IESEC  
IST.XXXToolbar          IE, IESEC  
ISTBar/AUpdate          IE, IESEC  
KrAIMer Remote Access 
Trojan 
          IE 
Laypros      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
MoneyTree Dialer      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
n-Case      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Pacimedia          IE, IESEC  
PeopleOnPage          IE, IESEC  
Possible Browser Hijack 
Attempt 
         IE, IESEC  
PowerScan          IE, IESEC  
Rotue      IESEC      
SahAgent      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
SearchExtender Spyware          IE  
SexList      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
ShopAtHome      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Spy # 32676      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Spy # 46b42          IE, IESEC  
Spy # 5a2ea          IE, IESEC  
Spy # 6d78b IE   IE        
Spy # 87366          IE, IESEC  
Spy # 9594c          IESEC  
Spy # d566d          IE, IESEC  
Spy # d9c03          IE, IESEC  
Spy # da439          IE, IESEC  
Spy # dcce8      IE, IESEC IE     
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Spyware / Adware Internet Sector 










Spy # fd1e0      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
TinyBar          IE, IESEC  
TopMoxie      IE, IESEC IE     
TopRebates.WebRebates 
Adware 
     IE, IESEC IE     
Transponder.ABetterIntern
et.Aurora Adware 
         IE, IESEC  
Trojan.Startup.NameShifte
r.I 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Unclassified.Spyware.57 
Spyware 
         IE, IESEC  
Unclassified.Spyware.61          IE, IESEC  
Win32.Trojan.ByteVerify.
A 
         IESEC  
Winad      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
WindUpdates Browser 
Plug-in 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
WindUpdates.MediaAcces
s 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Winsecure          IE, IESEC  
Xrenoder Browser Plug-in          IE, IESEC  
Zango Search Assistant 
Adware 
     IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
ZyncosMark          IE, IESEC  
Other*      IE, IESEC IE  IE, IESEC IE, IESEC  
Quicktime video player **           IE, IESEC 
* Unspecified spyware detection. 
** Although QuickTime video player is not generally considered spyware or adware, in this instance the software was installed 
without any interaction or approval by the script. 
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It is interesting to note that the online gambling Internet sector was found to have 
minimal spyware infection of the test bed.  As it pertains to this sector, infection of 
computers may be limited to the installation of shareware or freeware software, and less 
so associated with the use of drive-by-downloads. 
Upon completion of the experiments in each of the infected test beds, immediate 
operating system instability was observed.  The experiment was not concerned with 
documenting the degree of disruption to the test beds by the presence of spyware.  
Therefore, system metrics for CPU cycles, memory availability, and overall 
responsiveness, were not collected before or after infection.  However, obvious system 
degradation in responsiveness was noted and certain Windows features such as Explorer 
– used to view folders and files – were inoperable.  Additionally, spontaneous 
advertisings would popup while attempting to conduct the anti-spyware scans. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the sequence in which the various components of the 
experiment were carried out.  Based on this process, test beds were infected by spyware 
when visiting online travel and real estate-related web sites as well as with the high risk 
hacker and warez and adult entertainment-related web sites. 
A detailed discussion of the infection of the test beds follows in Chapter VI.  This 
chapter will describe some of the findings as a result of the collection of system 
snapshots after each visited URL.  It will further identify specific malicious web sites 
encountered during the course of the experiment. 
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VI. IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides the in-depth analysis of the experiment.  Each of the sectors 
found to have been infected is discussed in detail and an analysis of spyware infection for 
the sector is provided.  Additionally, detection comparison among the various anti-
spyware scanning tools is provided for each of the relevant sectors.  The chapter also 
discusses the infection of both default and patched test beds and the possible encounter of 
zero-day exploits during the course of the experiment.  Lastly, the chapter provides a list 
of some of the servers associated with the download of spyware-related binary files as 
well as some of the URLs identified as contributing to the infection of the test beds. 
A. BANKING SECTOR 
Analysis of the banking sector found infection of the IE test bed by at least one 
instance of spyware software. 
Figure 18is a print out of the HTTP network traffic as captured by Ethereal.  The 
figure shows the initial test bed request to download a file named object.cfm.  It is 
indicated in this request that the referrer web site is http://stats4all.ws/fa/.  This web site 
is registered with a Samoan domain and pretends to be stats4all.com, a web site which 
provides statistics and counters for web masters with information on the number of visits, 
type of browser used, and various other parameters associated with each visit.  In fact, 
stats4all.ws appears to be just a front domain with broken links, associated with a Russian 
domain hosting company.  This web site is receiving information about the client, 
including browser type, client screen resolution, number of colors shown, the existence of 
a java plug-in, and most interestingly, a “ref” parameter, presumably the referring web 
site, providing the URL of a web site from which stats4all.ws/fa was called.  In this 
instance, the referring web site is listed as one of the banks the test bench visited.  The 
reply from the server included a JScript script which invoked ActiveX objects to create a 
file in the local test bench.  The local file is named EjAGgj1l.exe and is located in a 
special temporary folder established by the script.  The file is not simply downloaded 
through a normal request but instead, it is crafted by the script within the test bench itself.  
The script creates the file, and writes ASCII characters ‘MZ’ before closing the file.  This 
represents in hexadecimal the signature of a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file.  
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Once these first characters are written to the file, the script opens the file a second time 
and proceeds to write UNICODE representations of characters in the format 
“\u0090\u0003\u0000….”  The previous example consists of the first three characters 
written to the file after the PE signature is written.  The script concludes by executing the 
file via the WScript.Shell command.  Please note the UNICODE portion of this script 
was truncated for presentation purposes.  Bolded sections of this figure emphasize some 
of the items discussed above.  The first bolded line shows the presence of object.cfm and 
the second and third line show the web statistics provider and the referring web site.  Of 
interest are the fourth and fifth bolded lines in which a call to create and run an 
executable file is made. 








Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 




HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Server: nginx/0.1.36 

























Figure 18 Creation Of An Executable File In Test Bench 
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A subsequent attack on the test bench originated soon after the crafting of this 
file.  The content of the UNICODE written into file EjAGgj1l.exe was not interpreted. 
However, it is possible that this first file is responsible for subsequent attacks observed in 
the network traffic captures. One in particular was associated with a GET method 
invoked by the IE test bench client to an IP address not associated with a bank URL.  The 
GET command requested the download of a file named “X.exe” from URL 
“189.dapfeed.com.”  This author reassembled the executable file from the network traffic 
capture files and proceeded to execute the file within a virtual machine, conducting 
limited black-box binary analysis.  A search for strings inside the executable file found 
the word “DIALER” as well as a 900-telephone number.  It should be noted that 
Earthlink’s SpyAudit and Spybot Search & Destroy identified one adware related 
program after the execution of this file.  SpyAudit preliminarily identified the program as 
Spy#6d78b while Spybot Search and Destroy identified the program as 
EffectiveBandToolbar.  The latter was based on a single registry entry and apparently 
failed to identified the many other changes and additions made to the registry by this 
program, as shown in Figure 19.  This may be indicative that a complete installation of 
the dialer program did not actually take place in the test bed, explaining the single 
registry entry, or that the Spybot Search and Destroy did not contain a more 
comprehensive list of identifying signatures for this spyware program at the time of the 
scan.  It appears this file is a dialer program designed to generate revenue for 1-900 type 
businesses by causing computers to dial out the number via modem communications.  
Additional analysis of registry queries conducted by this file revealed numerous queries 
to phonebook and Remote Access Server (RAS) related registry keys, further supporting 
the opinion that this file is associated with a malicious dialer program.  Upon conclusion 
of program execution, X.exe deletes itself.  As an ephemeral executable file, it is missed 





















HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed: E1 49 29 B3 2D 0F 3D 16 F9 
5D 77 FD 67 06 14 32 B7 70 9E 45 77 94 68 96 A2 27 57 59 61 BD 52 C5 04 2D D5 DB 42 F2 
37 06 03 B7 65 2E 47 F4 A2 BD 5C EF 43 B6 83 F5 54 DC 98 71 F3 A4 96 76 48 3C 33 6A A8 
FE DF 82 8E 7B C3 31 3B 7A 98 DB 57 51 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed: 88 4A 6F 44 C8 17 B8 A6 B5 
E3 7A BA 6E 9F 14 01 42 9D 4D 54 D0 0D 7C 5A 30 2B AB 2E DF EB 09 CA 51 98 E5 56 1A 79 
7D E6 69 52 8B AF C4 F0 13 E1 D5 B7 71 36 B4 F7 0D EE 18 9C EC B8 24 F7 AB EA AA E1 5A 

















9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU: 05 00 00 00 8F 00 00 00 00 93 3D B1 44 A9 C5 01 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-220523388-790525478-839522115-
500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-
9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU: 05 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 40 14 4B BA 44 A9 C5 01 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-220523388-790525478-839522115-
500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-
9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_HVFPHG: 05 00 00 00 39 00 00 00 10 21 A1 AF 44 A9 C5 01 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-220523388-790525478-839522115-
500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-





Figure 19 Registry Modifications Following Execution Of X.Exe 
 
Subsequent research into the specific 900-telephone number included in the 
executable file found that the SANS Internet Storm Center confirmed the findings 
provided here [21]. 
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A review of the URL access report generated by the experiment script ie.vbs 
revealed the browser suffered the first crash event of the experiment run when accessing 
URL number 279 out of the total of 501 URLs in the banking sector.  Additional crash 
events were observed from this point forward in the experiment.  URL 279 is associated 
with the bank web site referenced during the first attack. 
Figure 20 shows a limited view of the TCP connections present while accessing 
URL 279.  This information shows that while the browser was accessing the URL 
associated with bank 279, it was also accessing IP address 66.232.140.95.  This IP 
address was also seen in the traffic capture files collected by Ethereal.  This capture file 
shows the downloading of the JScript attack.  Items in bold show established TCP 
connections with IP address 66.232.140.95, the IP address associated with the 
downloading of the Jscript script shown in Figure 18. 
[TCP] [System Process] 
      PID:     0 
      State:   TIME_WAIT 
      Local:   ie:3465 
      Remote:  somebank.com:http 
[TCP] [System Process] 
      PID:     0 
      State:   TIME_WAIT 
      Local:   ie:3466 
      Remote:  somebank.com:http 
[TCP] [System Process] 
      PID:     0 
      State:   TIME_WAIT 
      Local:   ie:3519 
      Remote:  somebank.com:http 
[TCP] [System Process] 
      PID:     0 
      State:   TIME_WAIT 
      Local:   ie:3520 
      Remote:  somebank.com:http 
[TCP] C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe 
      PID:     1332 
      State:   ESTABLISHED 
      Local:   ie:3541 
      Remote:  66.232.140.95:http 
[TCP] C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe 
      PID:     1332 
      State:   ESTABLISHED 
      Local:   ie:3550 
      Remote:  66.232.140.95:http 
[TCP] [System Process] 
      PID:     0 
      State:   TIME_WAIT 
      Local:   ie:3568 
      Remote:  somebank.com:http 
Figure 20 TCP State while accessing URL 279. 
 
Based on this information, it appears that a visit to URL 279 may have initiated 
stats4all.ws and trustbid.ws to transmit malicious traffic to the test bed.  Both of the files 
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described above were launched from stats4all.ws and trustbid.ws, possibly causing the 
infection of the test bed with a dialer program.  However, although referrer fields in 
HTTP traffic during this Internet sector experiment show URL 279 referring traffic to the 
malicious stat4all.ws web site, it is possible to spoof such HTTP traffic, especially if the 
virtual machine was compromised by spyware prior to the start of the experiment.  For 
this reason, a conclusive link between the specific bank web site and the malicious attack 
could not be established. 
Additional Internet research on the nature of the attack observed during the 
experiment in the banking sector appears to point towards a cross-site-scripting type of 
attack.  Furthermore, between March and July of this year, a considerable number of 
comments were posted on various Internet forums regarding the injection of a script in 
web servers.  The script described in these comments is similar to the one described 
above, in which malicious files were downloaded from stats4all.ws and trustbid.ws. 
Finally, a literature search indicates that financial institutions were targeted for 
similar attacks in 2004.  According to [4, 8, 52, 69] attacks on IIS and Apache web 
servers may have placed millions of users at risk of infection with malware or spyware 
and attempts to steal personal and financial information. 
All four anti-spyware scanning tools did not find any spyware infection in the 
IESEC, FF, FFSEC, or PASSIVE test beds. 
B. INSURANCE SECTOR 
Analysis of the insurance sector test bed images found apparent infection by 
spyware.  According to SpyAudit, Spy#6d78b was identified as adware present in the IE 
test bed.  Spybot Search and Destroy reported EffectiveBandToolbar present in the IE test 
bed.  Spyware infection was not found by any of the anti-spyware tools in the IESEC, FF, 
FFSEC, or PASSIVE test beds. 
A closer review of network traffic captured during the course of the experiment 
failed to identify suspicious network activity.  It is suspected the reported spyware 
infection may be associated with baseline corruption as described in greater detail in 
Chapter VI Section H. 
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C. ONLINE TRAVEL SECTOR 
The online travel sector experiment revealed infection by spyware of the IE and 
IESEC test beds.  All four anti-spyware scanning tools reported spyware-related software 
in these test beds.  Table 6 shows a brief break-down of the number of spyware reported 
by each scanning tools. The number reported on the left side of the slash symbol is the 
number of individual spyware items.  Individual spyware items consist of a given name 
as assigned by the scanning tool, and associated executable files, dynamic link libraries, 
folders, or specific registry keys.  The numbers reported to the right of the slash pertain to 
specific signatures found by the scanning tools, for example, the number of files, folder, 
or registry keys associated with spyware.  Therefore, many signatures can be combined 
into one spyware item or reported under a given name. 
 
Table 6 Spyware Infection in the Online Travel Sector 
Test Bed SpyAudit Ad-aware Spybot S&D Microsoft 
AntiSpyware 
IE 6 8 / 164 11 / 61 14 /  620 
IESEC 6 8 / 168 12 / 61 14 /  614 
FF 0 0 0 0 
FFSEC 0 0 0 0 
PASSIVE 0 0 0 0 
 
A review of the integrity checker log revealed a total of 118 changes to the system 
since the baseline was established.  Some of these changes pertained to upgrades to the 
testing scripts and text files used to feed the URLs to the Internet sector being tested.  
Figure 21 shows a list of the spyware-related changes to the file system in the IE test bed.  
Additionally, TCP port 2400 and UDP port 1145 are now active and associated with 
WebRebates0.exe and salm.exe, respectively.  The Osiris-generated output shown in 
Figure 21 has been summarized for presentation purposes. 
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[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\cfout.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\djtopr1150.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\jkill.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\umqltg4cl_.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\180searchassistant\salm.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\180searchassistant\salmhook.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\optimize.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Media Gateway\Info.txt] 
















































[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\ClientAX.dll] 
[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\MediaGatewayX.dll] 














Figure 21 Spyware-Related Changes To The IE Test Bed File System As Reported 
By Osiris. 
 
Figure 22 shows a similar report generated by Osiris for the IESEC test bed.  
Although it clearly shows fewer changes to the file system, it also shows considerable 
continued success by spyware in gaining access to the test bed.  Salm.exe has 
successfully opened UDP port 1146 as it was the case in the IE test bed and the 
Background Intelligent Transfer Service appears to have been stopped.  According to 
Microsoft’s description for this service, if this service is stopped, Windows is unable to 
conduct automatic updates.  This appears to be an attempt to maintain the compromised 
system in a vulnerable and accessible state. 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\cfout.txt] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\djtopr1150.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\jkill.exe] 




[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\actalert.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\install.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\optimize.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\actalert.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\install.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\rogue.exe] 
[203][IESEC][new][C:\Program Files\Media Gateway\Info.txt] 
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[203][IESEC][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\ClientAX.dll] 
[203][IESEC][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\MediaGatewayX.dll] 









[223][IESEC][cmp][mod_kmods][service:BITS][service:BITS;dname:Background Intelligent Transfer 
Service;status:running][service:BITS;dname:Background Intelligent Transfer Service;status:stopped] 
[221][IESEC][new][mod_ports][UDP:1146][UDP:1146;exe=C:\Program 
Files\180searchassistant\salm.exe;pid=892] 
Figure 22 Spyware-Related Changes To The IESEC Test Bed File System As 
Reported By Osiris. 
 
A review of the network traffic captures for this experiment revealed the 
downloading of the executables through HTTP GET commands. In this instance, files 
180SAInstaller.exe and RBoomerang.1 are downloaded and installed on the IE test bed.  
Figure 23 shows the initial GET command by the client and the following response by 
the servers providing the binary files.  Text beginning with the letters “MZ….” pertains 
to the commencement of transmission of a Windows Portable Executable binary file.  




 commencement of the binary file transmission are shown in bold.  Figure 23 shows the 
installation of 180SAInstaller.exe from static.flingstone.com and the installation of 
RBoomerang.1 from installs.180solutions.com. 




HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Server: thttpd/2.25b 29dec2003 
Content-Type: application/octet-stream 
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2005 04:27:58 GMT 















HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Server: Apache 





Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2005 04:27:14 GMT 
Connection: keep-alive 
 




Figure 23 HTTP Get Commands Downloading 180Solutions Related Spyware 
Executable Files 
 
Table 7 provides a list of infection-related downloads during the course of two 
separate experiment runs for each platform.  During the first experiment execution, the IE 
platform was assigned IP address 10.10.10.31 and the IESEC platform was assigned 
10.10.10.41, respectively.  During the second experiment execution, IE was given IP 
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 address 10.10.10.30 and IESEC was given IP address 10.10.10.40.  This table shows 
various files with extensions “.exe”, “.dll”, and “.cab” being downloaded from common 
servers. 
Table 7 Online Travel Infection-Related Downloads 
Test 
Bed Source Destination HTTP GET 
IE 10.10.10.31 205.205.86.51 /cab/MediaAccessVerisign/ie/Bridge-c139.cab 
IE 10.10.10.31 205.205.86.51 /Release/v21/MediaGateway.exe 
IE 10.10.10.31 67.114.52.28 /downloads/dll/5.0/clienthook.dll 
IE 10.10.10.31 205.240.15.19 /cdt/setup4030.cab 
IE 10.10.10.31 146.82.109.210 /Dnl/T_50245/toolbar3.cab 
IE 10.10.10.30 205.205.86.51 /cab/MediaAccessVerisign/ie/bridge-c420.cab 
IE 10.10.10.30 205.205.86.51 /Release/v21/MediaGateway.exe 
IE 10.10.10.30 205.240.15.19 /cdt/setup4030.cab 
IE 10.10.10.30 67.114.52.28 /downloads/dll/5.0/clienthook.dll 
IE 10.10.10.30 146.82.109.210 /Dnl/T_50245/toolbar3.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.40 205.205.86.51 /cab/CDT/ie/bridge-c420.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.40 205.205.86.51 /cab/CDT/ie/bridge-c420.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 205.205.86.51 /cab/WebsiteAccess/ie/Bridge-c139.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 205.205.86.51 /Release/v21/MediaGateway.exe 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 205.240.15.19 /cdt/setup4030.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 69.225.175.11 /downloads/dll/5.0/clienthook.dll 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 146.82.109.210 /Dnl/T_50245/toolbar3.cab 
IESEC 10.10.10.41 69.28.178.8 /io/downloads/3/nem220.dll 
 
D. REAL ESTATE SECTOR 
The real estate sector experiment was found to infect the IE test bed.  Table 8 
provides a break-down of spyware as detected by each of the anti-spyware scanning 
tools.  As in Table 6, the numbers to the left of the slash symbol pertain to spyware 
counts while the numbers to the right pertain to the number of signatures detected by 
each of the scanners. 
 
Table 8 Spyware Infection in the Real Estate Sector 
Test Bed SpyAudit Ad-aware Spybot S&D Microsoft 
AntiSpyware 
IE 6 8 / 152 11 / 60 14 / 613 
IESEC 0 0 0 0 
FF 0 0 0 0 
FFSEC 0 0 0 0 
PASSIVE 0 0 0 0 
 
89 
A review of the integrity checker log revealed numerous changes made to the file 
system, similarly observed as in the case with the online travel sector.  As with Figure 21 
and Figure 22, the output of Osiris was edited for presentation purposes.  Changes made 
to the test bed clearly show files and folders associated with 180Solutions, Optimizer, 
ProSiteFinder, and Web_Rebates, to name a few.  All of these programs were identified 
as spyware by the anti-spyware scanning tools. 
 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\cfout.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\djtopr1150.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\jkill.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\umqltg4cl_.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\180searchassistant\salm.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\180searchassistant\salmhook.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\optimize.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Media Gateway\Info.txt] 

















































[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\ClientAX.dll] 
[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\MediaGatewayX.dll] 









Figure 24 Spyware-Related Changes To The IE Test Bed File System As Reported 
By Osiris. 
 
As with the online travel sector experiment, various attacks were observed in the 
network traffic capture file.  Figure 25 shows the initial steps associated with the 
installation of spyware.  The first block of text shows the IE client requesting web site 
www.angioedema-research.dzwonki.pruszkow.pl, a web site which was initially included 
in the list of URLs associated with the real estate sector.  It is apparent this URL is not 
associated with real estate as previously defined and thus is considered one of the 
previously identified “noise” web sites.  This web site contacts URL www.xxxcenter.org.  
This URL has been identified by various anti-spyware-related web sites as being 
associated with spyware software distribution.  The next phase of the attack consists of 
the downloading of script “prompt_ie_win.js” hosted at web server 
static.windupdates.com.  This server appears repeatedly in network traffic capture files 
and it is associated with the downloading of several spyware-related programs.  The last 
phase of the attack shows the static.windupdates.com server transmitting a javascript file. 
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A detailed analysis of this script was not performed, however, it is strongly suspected this 
script launches the downloading and installation of MediaGateway.exe.  Areas shown in 
bold pertain to the above referenced discussion. 
GET / HTTP/1.1 
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, */* 
Accept-Language: en-us 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 





Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 20:08:37 GMT 
Server: Apache/1.3.33 (Unix) 
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.3.11 
Set-Cookie: Hose_Stat_Visited=1; expires=Tue, 19 Jul 2005 20:08:42 GMT 
Location: http://www.xxxcenter.org 
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
Transfer-Encoding: chunked 








Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 




HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Server: thttpd/2.25b 29dec2003 
Content-Type: application/x-javascript 
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 20:09:07 GMT 





/*FLxwjZ1GS Eao*/var _c3b=_p_rm;var _r3W=_i_ci;var _e35=_p_cu;var _A3F=_p_lf;var 
_e3p=_p_cm;var _a3W=_p_dl;var _I38=_p_ry;var _z3z=_p_cd;var _O35=_p_pr;var _W3K=_i_br;var 
_Q33=_p_cl;var _a3M=_p_ct;var _k3o=_i_da;var _T3f=_p_cr;var _u3P=0;var _d3l=unescape;var  … 
Figure 25 Infection Setup by xxxcenter.org 
 
Table 9 provides a list of infection-related downloads during the course of the real 
estate test bed experiment.  This table shows test bed IE with IP address 10.10.10.30 
accessing six separate servers and downloading a total of six binary files.  A seventh 
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entry shows the transmission of encrypted information to s.dll at IP address 
199.221.131.90.  This file is associated with Sah spyware, identified by the anti-spyware 
scanning tools.  The first line in this entry shows the text “command=update,” possibly 
associated with the installation of additional spyware programs.  This line is shown in 
bold.  Decryption of the parameter was not attempted.  Files with extensions “.exe”, 
“.dll”, and “.cab” are shown on this table. 
Table 9 Online Travel Infection-Related Downloads 
Test Bed Source Destination HTTP GET 
IE 10.10.10.30 205.205.86.51 /cab/MediaAccessVerisign/ie/bridge-
c420.cab 
IE 10.10.10.30 205.205.86.51 /Release/v21/MediaGateway.exe 
































E. REMAINING SECTORS 
Infection of spyware was not found in the remaining sectors of the Internet.  Anti-
spyware scanning tools and integrity checking software was used to determine whether 
the virtual machine of each sector warranted in-depth analysis.  Therefore, based on these 
preliminary results, child, university, government, military, and insurance-related sectors 
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of the Internet tested by this experiment were not found to have been infected and thus 
were not analyzed in further detail.  It should be noted that although preliminary analysis 
reported the presence of one spyware related software in the insurance sector, further 
analysis indicated that the baseline used for the experiment may have been corrupted.  A 
detailed explanation of this is provided later in this chapter. 
Table 10 provides a summary of the number of infections detected by each of the 
scanning tools in each of the three high risk Internet sectors.  This table shows both IE 
and IESEC test beds becoming infected while visiting web sites in the adult 
entertainment and hacker-related sectors of the Internet. 
Table 10 Spyware Infection in High Risk Internet Sectors 
Sector Test Bed SpyAudit Ad-aware Spybot S&D Microsoft 
AntiSpyware 
Adult Entertainment 
IE 5 8 / 103 10 / 40 10 / 270 
IESEC 5 8 / 105 10 / 40 10 / 267 
FF 0 0 0 0 
FFSEC 0 0 0 0 
 
PASSIVE 0 0 0 0 
Hacker/Warez 
IE 16 17 / 395 23 / 180 30 / 1021 
IESEC 16 18 / 391 23 / 182 30 / 794 
FF 0 0 0 0 
FFSEC 0 0 0 0 
 
PASSIVE 0 0 0 0 
Online Gambling 
IE 0 0 0 1 / 1 
IESEC 0 0 0 0 
FF 0 0 0 0 
FFSEC 0 0 0 0 
 
PASSIVE 0 0 0 0 
 
One infection was detected by Microsoft’s AntiSpyware in the online gambling 
sector.  This infection was reported to be the KrAIMer remote access Trojan and the 
command.exe Windows file was reported to have been replaced.  However, the Osiris 
host integrity monitoring software did not report changes in this file. None of the Firefox-
based test beds or the PASSIVE test bed reported spyware infection. 
94 
F. GENERAL EXPERIMENT FINDINGS 
Through the course of the experiment several common spyware-related files and 
servers associated with these files were noted.  These sources of infection were observed 
for both the real estate and online travel sectors.  Table 11 shows a list of those files and 
associated servers.  This list is not meant to be comprehensive in nature but rather a list of 
the most common sources of infection.  Numerous other sources may be responsible for 
infection in the hacker and warez-related sector and in the adult entertainment-related 
sector of the Internet.  However, due to time constraints and the fact that these two 
sectors where only included in the experiment to allow a preliminary comparison 
between safe and unsafe areas of the Internet, detailed analysis of sources of infection 
was not conducted. 
Table 11 Observed Infectious Binaries And Associated Servers 




















Figure 26 and Figure 27 show a comparison of the four anti-spyware scanning 
tools in the IE and IESEC test beds for each of the experiment sectors.  These two figures 
show that Microsoft AntiSpyware consistently reports a higher number of spyware hits 
across the various sectors.  It is uncertain whether this information supports the findings 
of [31] since the data provided in that study pertains to the successful removal of adware 
while the data presented in these two figures pertains only to the detection of spyware.  It 
does appear, however, that the success of detection increases from left to right starting 
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with Earthlink’s SpyAudit, Ad-Aware, Spybot Search and Destroy, and Microsoft 
AntiSpyware, respectively.  Earthlink’s SpyAudit performed as expected given the fact 
that it performs a far faster, and presumably less comprehensive, scan of the system when 
compared against the other three scanning tools. 
A second important observation from these two figures is the fact that both the IE 
and the IESEC test beds were considerably infected by not just the high risk sectors of the 
Internet such as adult entertainment and hacker and warez-related web sites but also by 
web sites found within the online travel sector.  Three web sites were identified as 
malicious and responsible for the infections in this sector, based on the name of the 
URLs, these web sites did not appear to be false positives.  This indicates that although 
conducting the experiment in July of 2005 with a fully patched Windows XP platform, 
including Service Pack 2 and subsequent patches, the performance of the IESEC test bed 
was not significantly different from that of the IE test bed when encountering these three 
Internet sectors.  This data reveals that zero-day exploits were encountered by the test 
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Figure 27 IESEC Test Bed Spyware Infection by Sector 
 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 provide comparisons between all five separate test beds 
(IE, IESEC, FF, FFSEC, and PASSIVE) for each of the Internet sectors tested and for 
each of the platforms, respectively.  Figure 29 clearly shows two of the high risk sectors, 
adult-entertainment and hacker and warez-related sectors with significant infection for 
both IE and IESEC test beds.  For the purposes of these two figures, the total infections 
reported by each of the anti-spyware scanning tools were added for each of the test beds.  
Only Microsoft Internet Explorer-based test beds reported spyware infection.  
Additionally, the online travel sector reported a greater number of spyware infections 
than the adult-entertainment sector.  Lastly, the real estate sector showed a dramatic 
difference in infection between IE and IESEC test beds.  Apparently Service Pack 2 and 
subsequent patches installed in IESEC prevented infection encountered in this sector.  A 
single hit was reported for the IE test bed in the online gambling, and two hits were 
reported for the bank and insurance sectors.  It should be noted that two hits are reported 
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 for the latter sectors due to the summation of anti-spyware scanning results for each test 
bed.  In the case of the bank and insurance sectors, both Earthlink’s SpyAudit and Spybot 
Search and Destroy reported each an instance of spyware. 
Figure 29 shows that spyware infections associated with the adult entertainment, 
hacker and warez, and online travel-related sectors of the Internet was not significantly 
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Figure 29  Test Bed Infection Comparison by Platform 
 
G. MALICIOUS WEB SITES 
Analysis of the experiment data lead to the identification of various web sites as 
responsible for infecting the test beds with spyware.  These web sites are not specifically 
related to a particular industry but rather associated with the sector of the Internet in 
which they came up as a result of a search query in Google™ or as otherwise noted in 
Chapter IV.  Therefore, as in the case of the twelve malicious web sites found in the real 
estate sector, none of them are truly related to either property real estate or Internet real 
estate as previously defined.  Nevertheless, web sites identified as contributors to 
infection of the test beds are reported under the sector in which they conducted the 
infection.  The following is a list of these web sites: 
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Bank Sector: 
• Bank http://URL # 279 


















H. POSSIBLE BASELINE CORRUPTION 
During the course of this analysis, it was noted that both the banking and 
insurance sectors were found to have identical infection reports as provided by the anti-
spyware scanning tools.  According to SpyAudit, an adware category software identified 
as Spy#6d78b was reported present in the IE test bed.  Spybot Search & Destroy reported 
the presence of EffectiveBandToolbar in the same IE test bed.  The anti-spyware 
scanning tools reported the presence of these two items in the baselines as well as in the 
experiment virtual machines. 
Analysis of the network traffic captured during the course of each experiment 
found that the X.exe and JScript attacks described in Chapter VI Section A were present 
in the banking sector experiment but not in the insurance sector experiment.  The banking 
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sector experiment collected data on 10 July 2005 while the insurance sector experiment 
collected data on 11 July 2005.  Similar anomalies were not observed in the remaining 
test bed baseline images.  This information supports the theory that an apparent 
corruption of the baseline images of the host computers in the banking and insurance 
sectors took place between 10 and 11 July 2005.  The lack of corresponding exploit or 
attack related network traffic in the insurance sector experiment indicates that the 
infection of the insurance baseline image took place during the execution of the banking 
sector experiment. 
Furthermore, infection of the banking test bed baseline image is suspected to have 
occurred during the configuration of the test beds in preparation for the insurance sector 
experiment since the network traffic captures show downloading of the X.exe file as well 
as of the suspected malicious JScript script previously described. Lastly, attempts to 
replicate infection of a similarly configured test bed approximately six weeks after the 
initial data collection did not succeed, perhaps due to the dynamic nature of web servers 
and exploit use. 
I. FALSE POSITIVE URLS 
The selection of URLs for each of the Internet sectors tested in the experiment 
lead to the identification of URLs previously referred to as “noise” or false positives.  
These are URLs which, although found as a result of a particular query in the Google™ 
search engine, are not truly associated with the sector of the Internet intended to be 
tested.  The criteria used in determining these false positives consisted of: 
• Web sites which do not sell or provide services or products associated 
with the industry in question. 
• Web sites consisting of generic non-sector-specific search directories. 
• Web sites which return a custom invalid URL or request error page within 
the requested domain. 
An estimate of the number of false positive URLs was calculated by visually 
inspecting 75 URLs from the insurance, child, real estate, and online travel-related 
sectors.  Web sites in government, military, and university-related sectors were obtained 
through means other than a Google™ search query and are considered to contain few or 
no false positives.  Table 12 shows the number of false positives encountered when 
visually inspecting 75 web sites in each of these sectors.  An estimate of the number of 
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false positive URLs present in a set of 500 URLs is also provided.  Calculations were 
made using the hypergeometric distribution model with at least a 95% confidence. 
 
Table 12 False Positive URLs by Sector 





URLs Estimate  
(for 500 web sites) 
Confidence 
Insurance 75 1  1 to 30  0.95181 
Children 75 9  30 to 101  0.95007 
Real Estate 75 31  156 to 260  0.95029 
Online Travel 75 2  3 to 40  0.95181 
 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the findings of the in-depth analysis of the infection of 
various test beds by spyware.  Spyware infected test beds in the banking, online travel, 
and real estate-related sectors of the Internet.  Additionally, and as expected, high risk 
sectors of the Internet also infected the test beds with spyware.  The data shows that only 
Internet Explorer-based test beds were infected by spyware while Firefox-based test beds 
were not.  Furthermore, both unpatched and patched test beds were infected, supporting 
the conclusion that zero-day exploits were encountered by the experiments. 
Chapter VII will discuss three other research studies conducted in the area of 
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VII. RELATED WORK 
This chapter discusses and compares three recent spyware-related studies with the 
work conducted in this research. 
A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PROJECT 
The University of Washington Computer Science and Engineering department 
conducted a study on the presence of spyware within their network in 2003 [46].  The 
study provided a background introductory description of spyware, discussing various 
types of spyware programs and typical manner of host infection.  The study also 
described four spyware programs in particular, providing a detailed description of their 
behavior, and discussing vulnerabilities associated with two of these programs. 
The study uses definitions provided by the freeware software Spybot Search and 
Destroy in discussing various types of spyware such as browser hijackers, key loggers, 
tracks, malware, spybots, and adware.  The study considers cookies and web bugs to be 
spyware. 
The study collected network traffic over a period of one week starting on August 
26, 2003.  The campus network was reported to contain between 40,000 to 50,000 hosts 
with an average bandwidth of 238 Mb/s between the university domain and its ISP.  
Passive network traffic analysis was conducted and identification of infected hosts and 
spyware associated servers was performed through the analysis of HTTP connections.  
Correlations were made among client behavior and spyware infection, demonstrating that 
the greater the number of different web servers visited and the greater the number of 
executable files downloaded, the more likely the host would be infected by spyware.  
Additionally, peer-to-peer program installation and spyware presence appeared to be 
related, showing that in 38% of Kazaa-containing hosts, spyware appeared to be present. 
Spyware was noted to have successfully penetrated most organizational 
boundaries; finding that 69% of the organizations within the university environment 
contained at least one host infected with at least one variety of spyware.  Regardless of 
security policies and perimeter protection, spyware successfully infected internal users. 
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The report concluded that 5.1% of active hosts on campus were infected and that 
the security practices were not effective in preventing infection.  Additionally, 
vulnerabilities in Gator and eZula programs allowed arbitrary installation and execution 
of programs, revealing a significant security risk to infected hosts. 
The current study is similar to the University of Washington study in that network 
traffic analysis was performed to identify infection of the test beds in the experiment 
phase of the work.  While their study monitored traffic associated with 40,000 to 50,000 
hosts, and the experiment performed here monitored traffic generated by four test beds, 
their study did not provide empirical evidence for the hard drive of infected computers as 
was done here.  Finally, the University of Washington study did not consider infection as 
a result of surfing different sectors of the Internet. 
B. MICROSOFT PROJECT 
Microsoft Corporation has undertaken the study of spyware through at least three 
different studies [62, 63, 64].  Beginning with the concept of AskStrider, a scanning tool 
which “automatically scans a system for active components, matches them against a 
change log to identify recently updated and hence more interesting state, and searches for 
context information to help users understand the changes” [63].  This tool attempts to 
show recently changed files or states in a system by comparing against System Restore 
points, reviewing running processes and loaded modules, and reviewing all device drivers 
loaded into the system.  It queries file change history and ranks these files based on file 
age, showing the degree of system stability.  A case study is discussed in which drive-by-
downloads are responsible for the installation of HotBar Internet Explorer extensions.  
Infection by Internet Washer is also discussed in a separate case study.  In both instances, 
AskStrider shows a change has been made to the system state.  The tool can also be of 
assistance in troubleshooting problems associated with installations or upgrades of 
legitimate applications. 
In the second study [64], the concept of Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs) 
is introduced and a framework – Gatekeeper – is established for the detection of spyware 
infection.  According to the study, spyware can utilize various ways to start and maintain 
a process in a compromised system.  By monitoring these ASEPs, the study claims to be 
able to detect certain spyware infections.  The study relies on signature based scanning 
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tools such as Ad-Aware and Spybot Search and Destroy to detect initial infection.  
Gatekeeper provides continuous monitoring of ASEPs, including the recording, alerting, 
and blocking of any suspicious or undesirable ASEP hooking operations.  The study 
identified 34 ASEPs in 5 categories: ASEPs associated with the start of new processes, 
ASEPs that hook system processes, ASEPs that load drivers, ASEPs that hook multiple 
processes, and Application-specific ASEPs.  Statistics were provided on the various 
ASEPs hooked by spyware showing the use of Browser Helper Objects and Run 
commands as the two most often used out of 34 ASEPs.  Gatekeeper integrates with 
System Restore and AskStrider.  Combined, these led to the discovery of 17 previously 
undiscovered ASEPs.  The study concludes by asserting that the questions of “Where did 
it come from?”; “When was it installed, where was it installed, and what was installed?”; 
“How does it get instantiated?”; and “How do I disable/remove it?” are addressed by the 
study, leaving for future study the question “What does it do?” 
The two Microsoft studies discussed above led to a third report [62] pertaining to 
the identification of browser-exploiting malicious web sites.  The concept of an 
Automated Web Patrol is proposed as a way to significantly reduce the costs associated 
with monitoring malicious web sites.  The authors used programs designed to control 
Internet Explorer, named “monkeys,” to visit malicious web sites searching for browser 
exploits.  The approach consisted of selecting 5000+ potentially malicious URLs from 
lists compiled by the anti-spyware community and visiting these web sites with monkeys.  
The monkeys operated within virtual machines.  The virtual machines are used to 
facilitate the reinstallation of the test bed upon detection of a malicious web site and did 
not interact with the web sites other than by simply displaying the page.  Monkeys with 
various patch levels were used, starting with the lowest patch level (Windows XP SP1 
unpatched).  When a monkey encountered a malicious web site, it would shutdown, reset 
its state, and forward the malicious URL to the next higher patch-level monkey.  When 
the highest patch level monkey (Windows XP SP2 fully patched) detected infection, they 
assumed that a zero-day exploit was discovered.  This detection framework made use of 
Strider and Gatekeeper.  Additional links encountered in each of the identified malicious 
web sites were followed, leading to further malicious web site identification. 
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This study identified 752 malicious URLs.  Additionally, a web site using a zero-
day exploit was found in early July 2005.  The study also provides a comparison of the 
number of exploit URLs provided by each of three different popular search engines 
(Google, Yahoo, MSN).  The study also mentions that the top one million click-through 
links from an unnamed search engine are being monitored in order to asses if the “exploit 
industry” has penetrated popular sites. 
The study is similar to the experiment conducted here in that the concept of 
ASEPs are used to identify infection by specific URLs.  Scripts written here collected 
many auto-start data points mentioned in this and other studies as potential ways to 
identify spyware infection.  Furthermore, in both studies the preliminary analysis for 
possible spyware infection is conducted with Spybot Search and Destroy and Ad-Aware 
software, although the current experiment uses two additional scanning tools and a host 
integrity scanner.  Both the above referenced studies and the current experiment, visited 
web sites and attempted to document infection by spyware as a result of drive-by-
download exploits, requiring no interaction between the user and visiting web site. 
Significant differences exist in the manner in which URLs used in the experiment 
were collected.  The Microsoft researchers collected URLs from “host” files provided by 
anti-spyware scanning tools while the current study collected URLs through a 
combination of search engine queries and web site listings (e.g., FDIC bank list).  Finally, 
while this study mentions the monitoring of popular web sites served-up by search 
engines, the current study utilized a sector model of the Internet and a statistically 
significant sampling of sites from each Internet sector. 
C. UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PROJECT 
Researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln conducted an experiment 
between mid-October to mid-November of 2004 in which a total of 600 web sites were 
visited [49].  The experiment consisted of individually visiting each of the web sites and 
interacting with the site in a manner to “simulate the behavior of naïve users.”  Such 
behavior included clicking on advertisement banners and selecting “yes” when prompted 
to download or install software.  These web sites were obtained from 
www.trafficranking.com, a provider of market research information on the most visited 
web sites on the Internet.  The researchers utilized a “trust gauge” provided by 
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TrustGauge™ in determining the degree of trustworthiness associated with each of the 
web sites.  The experiment was organized into four sectors of the Internet.  The sectors of 
the Internet were comprised of E-Commerce, Recreation and Entertainment, Download 
Search and Directory, and News and Education related web sites.  Each of these four 
sectors was further subdivided into groups of 50 web sites according to a low, medium or 
high TrustGauge rating, for a total of 150 web sites per Internet sector.  The study used 
Ad-Aware and Spybot Search and Destroy to detect spyware infection.  As with the other 
experiments [46, 62], the problem concerning spyware is recognized to be large in scope.  
The study concluded that user browsing behavior is “responsible for much of the spyware 
dissemination on computers”  
Significant differences exist between the Nebraska study and the experiment 
conducted here.  While the Nebraska study [49] involved significant interaction with each 
visited web site by clicking on banners, links, and accepting any offer to install software 
presented to the user, the current experiment demonstrated the risks of surfing with 
minimal interaction.  Additionally, the current experiment involved more and larger 
Internet sectors.  Lastly, the concept of “safe” web sites is very different in the two 
studies.  Where the Nebraska study used the analysis of a third party, based on web seals 
and rankings, the current experiment designated various sectors of the Internet as safe or 
unsafe based on business type and other orientations. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
While many similarities exist in work performed in the experiment reported here 
and previously published spyware-related reports, significant differences exist in the 
methodology, manner in which URLs were collected and grouped in Internet sectors, and 
the level of interaction between user and web site.  Nevertheless, the results of all four 
studies, while utilizing different examination tools and techniques, are largely conformant 
in their conclusions and together provide a large corpus of data for future study, and a 
significant contribution to understanding vulnerabilities in the Internet today.  The 



























This thesis has resulted in a new definition of spyware and describes the extent of 
its presence, browser effectiveness in stemming infection, system patching effectiveness, 
relative perceived risk associated with various Internet sectors, perceived detection rates 
by various scanning tools, and penetration of malicious web sites into search engine 
results.  The following sections summarize the conclusions arrived at as a result of this 
work. 
A. DEFINITION OF SPYWARE 
Since its modest beginnings in the late 1990’s, spyware has steadily grown in 
complexity and presence, becoming a major security concern in just a few years.  
Defining spyware has been a challenge to security professionals due to the convergence 
of common technologies and the dynamic nature of software development.  Work 
conducted as part of this thesis has lead to the following new spyware definition: 
Spyware is a computer program that is either (1) developed with the 
express purpose to steal resources or collect user or organization data, or 
(2) deployed with the intent to profit financially or strategically from data 
collected, and must have four common activities.  These four activities 
are: hide, collect, communicate, and survive in a hostile environment.  Of 
course, spyware of type 1 may exhibit one or more of these four activities 
as well. 
The mechanics of spyware activities are as follows.  Spyware hides by 
using deceptive or surreptitious techniques.  Spyware collects system, 
organizational, or personal data.  Spyware communicates collected data to 
a remote or third party.  Spyware is designed with a degree of resilience, 
remaining present in a system as long as possible. 
The extent of the information collected, and program activities or 
capabilities, are diminished or hidden from the user through deception or 
obfuscation. 
Cookies and web bug technologies are not spyware because they do not posses all 
four basic activities (e.g., hide, collect, communicate, survive) and because they are not 
computer programs.  The misuse of cookies and web bugs can, however, achieve end 
results similar to spyware.  Thus it is possible to track user activities on the Internet 
through the use of cookies and web bugs common to affiliated web sites. 
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B. UBIQUITOUS PRESENCE 
Spyware has penetrated personal, business and government systems despite 
common defense-in-depth approaches.  Up-to-date patched computer systems, firewalls, 
and anti-virus programs have thus far failed to stem the tide of spyware infection.  
Empirical data from this thesis shows spyware infection is possible by visiting “safer” 
sectors of the Internet (e.g., banking, online travel, and real estate-related web sites) as 
well as “high risk” sectors of the Internet (e.g., Hacker/warez and adult entertainment-
related web sites). 
C. BROWSER PERFORMANCE 
Comparative empirical analysis of the performance of Internet browsers with 
respect to the likelihood of infection by spyware through drive-by-downloads has yielded 
dramatic results.  Experiments conducted by visiting web sites in eight “safe” and three 
“high risk” sectors of the Internet indicate infection through the use of drive-by-download 
techniques to be strictly limited to Microsoft Internet Explorer.  Mozilla Foundation’s 
Firefox Internet browser did not experience a single instance of infection. 
The reasons for these differences may lie in the fact that many spyware programs 
are currently using ActiveX exploits.  ActiveX is not supported by Firefox.  Additionally, 
it is speculated that greater emphasis is placed on the development of spyware for an 
Internet browser which is used by approximately 90% of the users on the Internet.  
Firefox currently holds approximately 8% of the browser market. 
The preponderance of the results towards Microsoft Internet Explorer is likely to 
change, then, as browser flaws are discovered and exploited in alternative browsers like 
Firefox.  Evidence of this can be seen in the disclosure of flaws in the way Firefox parses 
through Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs), allowing an attacker to execute 
arbitrary code [36]. 
D. PATCH PERFORMANCE 
While common wisdom dictates maintaining a computer system up-to-date with 
respect to security patches, empirical analysis of the various virtual machines has shown 
little difference in the spyware infection rates.  Comparisons among a default installation 
of Windows XP and a fully-patched installation which included Service Pack 2 and 
numerous other operating system and browser patches available up until before the 
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commencement of the experiments in July 2005 reveal similar infection.  Both IE and 
IESEC test beds showed infection when visiting web sites in the adult entertainment, 
hacker and warez, and online travel-related sectors of the Internet.  The IE test bed 
showed additional infection while visiting online gambling, banks, and insurance-related 
sectors of the Internet. 
While the results of the experiment show little difference in infection between 
patched and unpatched computer systems, a plausible explanation for this may reside in 
the use of overly permissive browser security configuration settings.  The design of the 
experiment considered maintaining browser settings at a level which provided commonly 
used or desired functionality, such as allowing ActiveX and other script execution, Java 
applets, Flash and Shockwave.  In this manner, test bed configurations are representative 
of commonly found systems in the real world. 
E. INTERNET SECTORS 
While it has been widely reported that “high risk” Internet surfing habits 
associated with the visiting of hacker and warez, online gambling, and adult 
entertainment-related web sites can lead to an increased risk of spyware infection, this 
thesis proposed to evaluate the safe sectors of the Internet.  Child-related, banking, 
university, government, military, online travel, insurance, and real estate-related web 
sites were evaluated for the use of drive-by-download spyware infection techniques. 
Consistent with commonly given advice, adult entertainment, and hacker and 
warez-related web sites were found to make use of drive-by-download techniques and 
infected both patched and unpatched test beds, with the latter sector showing the greatest 
number of infections. 
Surprisingly, the online gambling sector of the Internet, considered high risk by 
the author, showed only one infection. 
Both the online travel and the real estate sectors of the Internet showed spyware 
infection greater than that observed in the adult entertainment Internet sector.  Lastly, a 
single infection was also noted in the banking sector. 
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F. ANTI-SPYWARE SCANNING TOOLS 
Four different and freely available scanning tools were used to detect test bed 
spyware infection.  These tools were comprised of Earthlink’s SpyAudit, Lavasoft Ad-
Aware, Spybot Search and Destroy and Microsoft’s AntiSpyware. 
Empirical analysis of the virtual machines and comparative analysis among the 
four scanning tools shows that Microsoft’s AntiSpyware product consistently reported a 
higher number of infection, followed by Spybot Search and Destroy, Ad-Aware, and 
SpyAudit, in that order.  Since there is no standard way of reporting results among 
scanning tools, these results are not necessarily indicative of the detection success rate for 
a give tool, but rather, they are an indication of the perceived detection rate presented to a 
user.  Having said that, it is not surprising to see SpyAudit as the scanning tool with the 
smallest detection rates since it is a smaller application conducting a much faster scan, 
and therefore, is presumably less comprehensive. 
G. SPYWARE SITE PENETRATION OF GOOGLE™ 
While not all URLs used in the experimental phase of this thesis were obtained as 
a result of Google™ search queries, all URLs for the adult entertainment, online 
gambling, hacker and warez, government, military, online travel, insurance, and real 
estate-related sectors of the Internet were.  The results of this experiment show that 
malicious web sites have successfully gained a degree of prominence in the results 
returned by the Google™ search engine for the adult entertainment, online gambling, 
hacker and warez, online travel, and real estate-related Internet sectors. 
Since the details of the Google™ search engine algorithms are not public, it is 
uncertain if the presence of these malicious web sites in the search results is due to the 
amount of traffic visiting these web sites, the number of links referring to the web sites, 
or the length of their presence on the Internet. 
H. FURTHER WORK 
The development of the experiment phase of this thesis has revealed the need for 
alternative and improved spyware infection testing and detection techniques.  Based on 
the experiences noted in Chapter V, including a number of virtual machine, browser, and 
script crashes, it is apparent a more reliable approach is warranted.  This author proposes 
migrating the detection technique away from real-time system registry snap shots to a 
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more integrated application which could instead hook system calls associated with 
common spyware installation activities.  It is proposed to intercept system calls, and log 
attempted activities for subsequent analysis. 
Additionally, improved integration, including scripting and logging of the test 
environment from outside the virtual machines is desired, similar to the work described in 
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APPENDIX A – SCRIPTS 
This appendix provides VBScript scripts written for the experiment.  The scripts 
were used to drive the browser applications and collect data.  Five scripts are provided; 
ie.vbs and firefox.vbs were used to drive browser applications to Internet web sites, 
miner.vbs called various third party tools to generate a system state snap shot, 
registry.vbs queried registry values and wrote baseline registry values to the test bed 
registry, and collector.vbs gathered browser specific information such as bookmarks and 
favorites. 
 




'* File:  ie.vbs 
'* Created: July 10, 2005 
'* Version: 2.75 Beta 
'* Author:  Mark Barwinski, Naval Postgraduate School 
'*  
'* Parameters: [Platform] such as IE, IESEC 
'*   [SECTOR] such as Military, Universities, etc 
'*   [SKIP] number of lines (urls) to skip from original 
'*   run. 
'*  
'* Description: Drives Internet Explorer by reading URLs from  
'*   c:\tools\urls and writing time stamps to a  
'*   s:\[Platform]\[Platofrm] URL Access Report.txt file. 
'*    
'*    
'* 
'* Output:  Saves one text file for each URL visited 
'*   in the s:\PLATFORM folder. name consists of  
'*   registry + url.txt and is created by  
'*   c:\tools\registry.vbs 
'* 
'* Assumptions: 1.- Browser running as Administrator  
'*   2.- Makes use of c:\tools\reg outside registry tool  
'*   3.- Location of Reset Files: c:\tools\baseline\ 
'*   4.- Makes use of c:\tools\registry.vbs 
'*   5.- Makes use of c:\tools\urls 










Dim fso, f, r, info, timeoutSeconds, elapsedSeconds, args, argNames, Platform, 
Destination, URLReport, Sector 
Dim objShell, oIE, ReadTextFileTest, URLCount, strFName, startTime, endTime, 
sTime, mTime, hTime 
Dim shl, wins, i, x, win, mainIE, IE, popup, colWindow, TestDate, FilePosition, 
SkipLoop, SkipFLAG 
122 
Dim oDismiss, success 
dim command2, objExec, IEState 
 
URLCount = 1 
Const ForReading = 1 
Const ForWriting = 2 
Const ForAppending = 8 
 
'Wait Time between completion of site loading and test execution 
Const RateSpeed = 5000 
Dim AccessTime 
TimeoutSeconds = 15 
elapsedSeconds = 0 
 
Set args = WScript.Arguments 
Set argNames = WScript.Arguments.Unnamed 
    
   if (args.Count <= 0) then 
    Platform = "" 
    WScript.Echo "Must enter a platform parameter" & _ 
    vbCRLF & "IE = Internet Explorer" & vbCRLF & "IESEC = Internet Explorer 
Secure" 
    WScript.Quit() 
   else 
    if (args.Count > 2) then 
     Platform = args.Item(0) 
     Sector = args.Item(1) 
     FilePosition = args.Item(2) 
     SkipFLAG = 1 
 else  
     Platform = args.Item(0) 
     Sector = args.Item(1) 
     FilePosition = 0 
     SkipFLAG = 0 
    end if 
   end if 
    
 
Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & Sector & " URL Access Report.txt" 
 
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
Set f = fso.OpenTextFile("c:\tools\urls.txt", ForReading) 
if (fso.FileExists(Destination)) then 
 Set URLReport = fso.OpenTextFile(Destination, ForAppending)  
else 
 Set URLReport = fso.CreateTextFile(Destination, False) 
end if 
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
Set oDismiss = WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 




'Set oIE=CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application", "IE_") 
'This is how I trap and event such as IE_onQuit 
Set oIE=WScript.CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application", "IE_") 
With oIE 









startTime = Now() 
TestDate = Date() 
URLReport.WriteBlankLines(2) 





URLReport.WriteLine "Count" & vbTab & "Access Time" & vbTab & vbTab & "Download 
Status" & vbTab & "URL Visited" 




WScript.Echo "Count" & vbTab & "Access Time" & vbTab & vbTab & "Download Status" 
& vbTab & "URL Visited" 
 
 
'Need to add a not to exceed timeout so the page does not hang 
'if it fails to load 
 
Do While f.AtEndOfStream <> True 
  
 if (SkipFLAG = 1) then 
      
   for x = 1 to FilePosition 
    f.SkipLine 
    URLCount = URLCount + 1 
   next  
    SkipFLAG = 0 
    
 else 
  
 ReadTextFileTest = f.Readline 
 
 on error resume next 
 oIE.navigate ReadTextFileTest 
 Wscript.Sleep 5 
   
 Do while oIE.ReadyState <> 4 and elapsedSeconds < timeoutSeconds 
 Wscript.Sleep 1000 
 elapsedSeconds = elapsedSeconds + 1 
 Loop 
 IEState = oIE.ReadyState 
 if err.number <> 0 then 
  oIE.Quit() 
 end if  
   
 AccessTime = Now() 
 WScript.Sleep RateSpeed 
 URLReport.WriteLine(URLCount & vbTab & AccessTime & vbTab & vbTab & 
IEState & vbTab & ReadTextFileTest) 
 WScript.echo URLCount & vbTab & AccessTime & vbTab & vbTab & IEState & 
vbTab & ReadTextFileTest 
  
 On Error Goto 0 
 
 strFName = URLCount & Sector 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\registry.vbs " & Platform & " " & 
strFName), 7, True 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\collector.vbs " & Platform & " " & 
strFName), 7, True 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\miner.vbs " & Platform & " " & strFName), 
7, True 
  
 elapsedSeconds = 0 
 URLCount = URLCount + 1 
  
 oDismiss.SendKeys "%n" 
 WScript.Sleep 200 
 oDismiss.SendKeys "{ESC}" 
 WScript.Sleep 200 
 oDismiss.SendKeys "%c" 
 end if 
   
Loop 
endTime = Now() 
WScript.Sleep 300 
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sTime = DateDiff("s", startTime, endTime) Mod 60 
mTime = DateDiff("n", startTime, endTime) Mod 60 
hTime = DateDiff("h", startTime, endTime)  
URLReport.WriteLine(vbNewLine & "End Time: " & endTime & vbNewLine & "Total Run 
Time (h:m:s): " & hTime & ":" & mTime & ":" & sTime) 
WScript.echo (vbNewLine & "End Time: " & endTime & vbNewLine & "Total Run Time 




set shl = nothing 
set oIE = nothing 






WScript.Echo "Executing counterpart Script" 
command2 = "cmd /c ""c:\tools\ie.vbs"" " & Platform & " " & Sector & " " & 
URLCount 
WScript.Echo command2 
'set objExec = objShell.Exec(command2) 




Sub IE_NewWindow2(ByVal pDisp, ByVal URL) 
 WScript.Echo "Killing New Window" 




Sub IE_NavigateError(ByVal pDisp, ByVal URL, ByVal TargetFrameName, ByVal 
StatusCode, ByRef Cancel) 
 WScript.Echo "Navigation Error: " & StatusCode  






'* File:  firefox.vbs 
'* Created: June 29, 2005 
'* Version: 2.2 
'* Author:  Mark Barwinski, Naval Postgraduate School 
'*  
'* Parameters: [Platform] FF, FFSEC 
'*   [SECTOR] such as Military, Universities, etc 
'*   [SKIP] number of lines (urls) to skip from original 
'*   run. 
'*  
'* Description: Drives Firefox by reading URLs from  
'*   c:\tools\urls and writing time stamps to a  
'*   s:\[Platform]\[Platofrm] URL Access Report.txt file.   
'*   It also invokes the following files: 
'*   c:\tools\registry.vbs 
'*   c:\tools\miner.vbs 
'*   c:\tools\collector.vbs 
'*    
'* 
'* Output:  Saves one text file for each URL visited 
'*   in the s:\[Platform] folder. name consists of  
'*   registry number + [Platform] + [type of file].txt   
'*    
'* 
'* Assumptions: 1.- Browser running as Administrator  
'*   2.- Makes use of c:\tools\reg outside registry tool  
'*   3.- Location of Reset Files: c:\tools\baseline\ 
'*   4.- Makes use of c:\tools\registry.vbs 
'*   5.- Makes use of c:\tools\urls 
'*   6.- Makes use of s:\[Platform]\[Platofrm] URL Access 










Dim fso, f, r, info, Sector, URLCount, strFName, args, argNames, x 
Dim Platform, Destination, URLReport, startTime, endTime, url, TestDate, 
FilePosition, SkipLoop, SkipFLAG, sTime, mTime, hTime 
Dim objShell, Firefox 
'Wait Time between completion of site loading and test execution 
Const RateSpeed = 5000 
Const ForReading = 1 
Const ForWriting = 2 
Const ForAppending = 8 
Dim AccessTime 
URLCount = 1 
 
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
Set f = fso.OpenTextFile("c:\Tools\urls.txt", ForReading) 
 
Set args = WScript.Arguments 
Set argNames = WScript.Arguments.Unnamed 
    
   if (args.Count <= 0) then 
    Platform = "" 
    WScript.Echo "Must enter a platform parameter" & vbCRLF & "FF = Firefox" 
& _ 
    vbCRLF & "FFSEC = Firefox Secure"  
    WScript.Quit() 
   else 
    if (args.Count > 2) then 
      Platform = args.Item(0) 
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      Sector = args.Item(1) 
      FilePosition = args.Item(2) 
      SkipFLAG = 1 
  else  
      Platform = args.Item(0) 
      Sector = args.Item(1) 
      FilePosition = 0 
      SkipFLAG = 0 
    end if 
   end if 
      
Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & Sector & " Firefox URL Access Report.txt" 
if (fso.FileExists(Destination)) then 
 Set URLReport = fso.OpenTextFile(Destination, ForAppending)  
else 
 Set URLReport = fso.CreateTextFile(Destination, False) 
end if 
 
'Set objShell = WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
 
url = "about:blank" 
FireFox = objShell.Run("firefox.exe", 3) 
objShell.AppActivate "Mozilla Firefox" 
 
WScript.Sleep 5000 
startTime = Now() 
TestDate = Date() 
















Do While f.AtEndOfStream <> True 
 
 if (SkipFLAG = 1) then 
     
  for x = 1 to FilePosition 
   f.SkipLine 
   URLCount = URLCount + 1 
      
  next  
     
   SkipFLAG = 0 
   
 else 
  
 url = f.Readline 
  
 objShell.SendKeys "%n" 
 WScript.Sleep 500 
 objShell.SendKeys "{ESC}" 
 WScript.Sleep 500 
 objShell.SendKeys "^l" 
 WScript.Sleep 1500 
 objShell.SendKeys "^a" 
 objShell.SendKeys "{DEL}" 
 WScript.Sleep 1000 
 objShell.SendKeys url 




 AccessTime = Now() 
 URLReport.WriteLine(URLCount & vbTab & AccessTime & vbTab & url) 
 WScript.Echo URLCount & vbTab & AccessTime & vbTab & url 
  
 WScript.Sleep RateSpeed  
 strFName = URLCount & Sector 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\registry.vbs " & Platform & " " & 
strFName), 7, True 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\collector.vbs " & Platform & " " & 
strFName), 7, True 
 objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\miner.vbs " & Platform & " " & strFName), 
7, True 
  
 URLCount = URLCount + 1 
  
 end if 
Loop 
f.Close() 
endTime = Now() 
 
sTime = DateDiff("s", startTime, endTime) Mod 60 
mTime = DateDiff("n", startTime, endTime) Mod 60 
hTime = DateDiff("h", startTime, endTime)  
URLReport.WriteLine("End of Run: " & endTime) 
URLReport.WriteLine(vbNewLine & "End Time: " & endTime & vbNewLine & "Total Run 
Time (h:m:s): " & hTime & ":" & mTime & ":" & sTime) 
WScript.Echo ("End of Run: " & endTime) 
WScript.echo (vbNewLine & "End Time: " & endTime & vbNewLine & "Total Run Time 
(h:m:s): " & hTime & ":" & mTime & ":" & sTime) 
URLReport.Close() 
 









'* File:           miner.vbs 
'* Created:        July 4, 2005 
'* Version:        2.0 
'* 
'* Main Function:  Pass two parameters and it executes the tool and . 
'*    directs output to a text file of your choice 
'*   toolFunction [Tool Name] [File Output Name] 





Const AutoRunsc = "C:\tools\autorunsc.exe -a -w -s -e -d -m -p" 
Const Handles = "C:\tools\handle -u" 
'Const Processes = "c:\tools\pslist.exe -d -m" 
Const Processes = "tasklist /SVC /FO TABLE" 
Const TCP = "c:\tools\tcpvcon.exe -a" 
Const NETSTAT = "netstat -ano" 
Const Service = "c:\tools\psservice.exe" 
Dim File, args, argNames, Platform, CurrentURL 
 
 
Set args = WScript.Arguments 
Set argNames = WScript.Arguments.Unnamed 
Platform = args.Item(0) 




File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "AutoRuns.txt" 
call Tool(AutoRunsc, File)    
 
File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "Handles.txt" 
call Tool(Handles, File)    
 
File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "ProcessList.txt" 
call Tool(Processes, File)  
 
File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "TCP.txt" 
call Tool(TCP, File)  
 
File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "NETSTAT.txt" 
call Tool(NETSTAT, File)  
 
File = "s:\" & Platform & "\" & CurrentURL & "Service.txt" 
call Tool(Service, File)  
 
Function Tool(strName, strOutputFile) 
    Dim fso, MyFile, objShell, objScriptExec, strBuff 
    Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
    Set MyFile = fso.CreateTextFile(strOutputFile,1,True) 
    Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
    Set objScriptExec = objShell.Exec(strName) 
    strBuff = objScriptExec.StdOut.ReadAll 
  '  WScript.Echo strIpConfig 
MyFile.WriteLine(strBuff) 
MyFile.Close 







'* File:  Registry.vbs 
'* Created: June 23, 2005 
'* Version: 1.3 
'* Author:  Mark Barwinski, Naval Postgraduate School 
'*  
'* Parameters: FF (Firefox), FFSEC (Firefox Secure)  
'*   IE (Internet Explorer), IESEC (IE Secure)  
'*   save creates a baseline of registry keys to be stored 
'*   in the c:\tools\baseline folder 
'*  
'*   May take a second parameter = CurrentURL passed by 
'*   the driver program 
'* 
'* Description: Collects various registry keys associated with   
'*   autostart of programs and services. It also collects 
'*   keys associated with BHO in IE and other security  
'*   settings.  It also enumerates files in the startup 
'*   folders for both the Administrator and the All Users 
'*   folder. Once the data is collected, it deletes all 
'*   files in the Startup folders 
'* 
'*   Registry keys are read from a text file located at 
'*   c:\thesis coding\tools\Keys.txt 
'*   This location changes to c:\tools\Keys.txt in the 







'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit 
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Shell 
   
'* HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell  
  
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Shell 
   
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell  
  
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Taskman  
  
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run    
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx    
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce    
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load  
  
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Run  
  
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 
   
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 
   
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run    
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce    
'* 
'* 
'* C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup  
  














'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components    
'* HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components    
'*
 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SharedTaskSchedul
er    
'*
 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoa
d    
'*
 HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoa
d    
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellExecuteHooks 
   
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved 
   
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer 
'* 
'* INTERNET EXPLORER 
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper 
Objects    
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar    
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions  
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search 











'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\0 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\1 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\2 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\3 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\4 
'* 
'* APPINIT 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls 
   
'* 
'* WINLOGON NOTIFICATIONS 
'* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify  
  
'* 




og9    
'* 




'*    
'* MODIFICATION OR DEFAULT FOLDER LOCATION 
'* HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell 
Folders 
'* HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell 
Folders 
'* 
'* ADDITIONAL INSTALLATION VECTORS 
'* HKCR\PROTOCOLS\Name-Space Handler 
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'* HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper 
'* 












'*   Upon completion of the collection of these keys, keys are 
'*   RESET to the baseline condition by writing files from the 
'*   c:\tools\baseline\ folder 
'* 
'* 
'*    
'* 
'* Output:  Saves one file with all the values for the 
abovereferenced   
'*   keys to a folder of choice. 
'* 
'* Assumptions: 1.- Browser running as Administrator  
'*   2.- Makes use of c:\tools\reg outside registry tool  
'*   3.- Location of Reset Files: c:\tools\baseline\ 
'*   4.- Keys must be located in Keys.txt file 
'* 
'* 










Dim CurrentURL  
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
Dim Platform, args, oFS, Target, Destination, Errors, ErrorsFile, i, argNames, 
tempLoc 
Dim ErrorFile 
Dim MyFile, objShell, objScriptExec, strShellOutput, NewFileName, objFolder, 
objFile, colFiles 
Dim KeyNames(85) 
Dim RegFileName, command, fKeys, arrayIndex 
Const ForReading = 1 
 
'Require outside of loop 
Const HKEY_Shell_100 = "HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop"  
Const HKEY_Shell_100_Parameters = " /v Wallpaper" 
Const HKEY_Shell_101 = "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" 
Const HKEY_Shell_101_Parameters = " /v Userinit" 
 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
'Initialize the Array with Keys from Keys.txt file 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
arrayIndex = 0 
Set oFS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
Set fKeys = oFS.OpenTextFile("c:\Tools\Keys.txt", ForReading) 
Do While fKeys.AtEndOfStream <> True 
 KeyNames(arrayIndex) = fKeys.Readline 







'Check to see if any arguments were passed to the script 
'arguments may be: FF, FFSEC, IE, IESEC depending on the 
'platform. If first argument is 'localhost' then run 
' a baseline 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
Set args = WScript.Arguments 
Set argNames = WScript.Arguments.Unnamed 
 
 
if (args.Count <= 0) then 
Platform = "" 
WScript.Echo "Must enter a platform parameter" & vbCRLF & "FF = Firefox" & _ 
vbCRLF & "FFSEC = Firefox Secure" & vbCRLF & "IE = Internet Explorer" & _ 




 Platform = args.Item(0) 
 
 if ((args.Item(0) = "IE") or (args.Item(0) = "IESEC") or (args.Item(0) = 
"FF") or (args.Item(0) = "FFSEC")) then 
  
 Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" 
 ErrorsFile = "s:\" & Platform & "\errors.txt" 




 else  
  
 Select Case args.Item(0) 
  Case "localhost" 
  Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" 
  ErrorsFile = "s:\" & Platform & "\errors.txt" 
  CurrentURL = "BASELINE" 
  RegistryCollection() 
   
  Case "save" 
  'WScript.Echo "save" 
  tempLoc= args.Item(1) 
  Destination = "s:\Baseline\" & tempLoc & "\" 
  ErrorsFile = "s:\Baseline\" & tempLoc & "\errors.txt" 
  SaveRegistry() 
   
  Case "restore" 
  'WScript.Echo "restore" 
  tempLoc= args.Item(1) 
  Destination = "s:\Baseline\" & tempLoc & "\" 
  ErrorsFile = "s:\Baseline\" & tempLoc & "\errors.txt" 
  RestoreRegistry() 
  RestoreStartupFolders() 
 End Select 
 end if 
end if 
WScript.Quit() 






'RegistryCollection performs all data collection and also 




Set oFS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
 
NewFileName = Destination & CurrentURL & "REG.txt" 
Set MyFile = oFS.CreateTextFile(NewFileName,1,True) 
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Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
 
For i = 0 to UBound(KeyNames) 
 On Error Resume Next 
 MyFile.WriteLine("HKEY_" & (i+1) & vbNewLine & "-------------------------
---------") 
 Set objScriptExec = objShell.Exec("c:\tools\reg query " & chr(34) & 
KeyNames(i) & chr(34) & " /s") 
 strShellOutput = objScriptExec.StdOut.ReadAll 
  
 if strShellOutput = "" then  
 strShellOutput = "Nothing Entered in Key: " & KeyNames(i) 
 end if 
 MyFile.WriteLine(strShellOutput) 
 MyFile.WriteLine("----------------------------------") 
 if (Err.Number > 0) then 
  WriteError() 




On Error Resume Next 
Set objScriptExec = objShell.Exec("c:\tools\reg query " & chr(34) & 
HKEY_Shell_100 & chr(34) & HKey_Shell_100_Parameters) 
strShellOutput = objScriptExec.StdOut.ReadAll 
 if strShellOutput = "" then  
 strShellOutput = "Nothing Entered in Key: " & HKEY_Shell_100 & 
HKey_Shell_100_Parameters 
 end if 
 MyFile.WriteLine(strShellOutput) 
 if (Err.Number > 0) then 
  WriteError() 
    end if 
 
On Error Resume Next 
Set objScriptExec = objShell.Exec("c:\tools\reg query " & chr(34) & 
HKEY_Shell_101 & chr(34) & HKey_Shell_101_Parameters) 
strShellOutput = objScriptExec.StdOut.ReadAll 
 if strShellOutput = "" then  
 strShellOutput = "Nothing Entered in Key: " & HKEY_Shell_101 & 
HKey_Shell_101_Parameters 
 end if 
 MyFile.WriteLine(strShellOutput) 
 if (Err.Number > 0) then 
  WriteError() 






'ENUMERATION OF ALL USERS STARTUP FOLDER 
MyFile.WriteLine(vbNewLine & vbNewLine & "Enumeration of the Users Startup 
Folder in") 
MyFile.WriteLine("C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup" & _ 
 vbNewLine & "----------------------------------") 
MyFile.WriteLine("File Name" & vbTab & "File Size") 
MyFile.WriteLine("----------------------------------") 
Set objFolder = oFS.GetFolder("C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup") 
Set colFiles = objFolder.Files 
For Each objFile in colFiles 
 MyFile.WriteLine(objFile.Name & vbTab & objFile.Size) 
Next 
 
'ENUMERATION OF ADMINISTRATOR STARTUP FOLDER 
MyFile.WriteLine(vbNewLine & vbNewLine & "Enumeration of the Administrator 
Startup Folder in") 
MyFile.WriteLine("C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup" & _ 
 vbNewLine & "----------------------------------") 
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MyFile.WriteLine("File Name" & vbTab & "File Size") 
MyFile.WriteLine("----------------------------------") 
Set objFolder = oFS.GetFolder("C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup") 
Set colFiles = objFolder.Files 
For Each objFile in colFiles 
 MyFile.WriteLine(objFile.Name & vbTab & objFile.Size) 
Next 
 
'ENUMERATION OF COOKIES FOLDER 
MyFile.WriteLine(vbNewLine & vbNewLine & "Enumeration of the Cookies Folder in") 
MyFile.WriteLine("C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Cookies" & _ 
 vbNewLine & "------------------------------------------------") 
MyFile.WriteLine("File Name" & vbTab & vbTab & vbTab & "File Size") 
MyFile.WriteLine("------------------------------------------------") 
Set objFolder = oFS.GetFolder("C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Cookies") 
Set colFiles = objFolder.Files 
For Each objFile in colFiles 
 MyFile.WriteLine(objFile.Name & vbTab & vbTab & vbTab &  objFile.Size) 
Next 
 
'ENUMERATION OF FAVORITES FOLDER 
MyFile.WriteLine(vbNewLine & vbNewLine & "Enumeration of the Favorites Folder 
in") 
MyFile.WriteLine("C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Favorites" & _ 
 vbNewLine & "----------------------------------") 
MyFile.WriteLine("File Name" & vbTab & "File Size") 
MyFile.WriteLine("----------------------------------") 
Set objFolder = oFS.GetFolder("C:\Documents and 
Settings\Administrator\Favorites") 
Set colFiles = objFolder.Files 
For Each objFile in colFiles 
















 Set Errors = oFS.OpenTextFile(ErrorsFile, 8, "True") 
 WScript.Echo Cstr(Err.Number) & vbCRLF & Err.Source & vbCRLF & 
Err.Description 
   Errors.WriteLine(Now() & vbTab & "Error: Could not query 
Registry for " & Platform & " when accessing " & CurrentURL & vbCRLF _ 
        & "Error Number: " & Cstr(Err.Number) & vbTab & 
"Error Source: " & Err.Source & vbTab & "Error Description: " _ 
        & Err.Description & vbNewLine) 






'Restores the registry settings back to the baseline 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
sub RestoreRegistry() 
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
For i = 0 to UBound(KeyNames) 
 command = "cmd /c c:\tools\reg restore " & chr(34) & KeyNames(i) & 
chr(34) & " " & Destination & "RegFileName" & CStr((i+1)) & ".hiv" 
 objShell.Run(command), 7, False 
Next  
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objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\reg restore " & chr(34) & HKEY_Shell_100 & chr(34) 
& " " & Destination & "RegFileName" & "100" & ".hiv"), 7, False 
objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\reg restore " & chr(34) & HKEY_Shell_101 & chr(34) 








'Create Baseline by Saving Registry  
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
sub SaveRegistry() 
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
For i = 0 to UBound(KeyNames) 
 command = "cmd /c c:\tools\reg save " & chr(34) & KeyNames(i) & chr(34) & 
" " & Destination & "RegFileName" & CStr((i+1)) & ".hiv" 
 objShell.Run(command), 7, False 
Next  
objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\reg save " & chr(34) & HKEY_Shell_100 & chr(34) & 
" " & Destination & "RegFileName" & "100" & ".hiv"), 7, False 
objShell.Run("cmd /c c:\tools\reg save " & chr(34) & HKEY_Shell_101 & chr(34) & 






'Restore all Startup folders by deleting all EXE and LNK files 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
sub RestoreStartupFolders() 
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
command = "cmd /c del /Q " & chr(34) & "C:\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.*" & chr(34)  
objShell.Run(command), 7, False 
command = "cmd /c del /Q " & chr(34) & "C:\Documents and 





Const HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE = &H80000001 
dim strComputer, Subkey, strKeyPath, objReg, arrSubKeys 
strComputer = " 
 
Set objReg=GetObject("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & _  
    strComputer & "\root\default:StdRegProv") 
 
strKeyPath = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet 
Settings\ZoneMap\Domains" 
objReg.EnumKey HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,strKeyPath, arrSubKeys 
if (isArray(arrSubKeys) = -1) then 
 for each Subkey in arrSubKeys 
  objReg.DeleteKey HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,strKeyPath & "\" & Subkey & 
"\www" 




strKeyPath = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet 
Settings\P3P\History" 
objReg.EnumKey HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,strKeyPath, arrSubKeys 
if (isArray(arrSubKeys) = -1) then 
 for each Subkey in arrSubKeys 








'* File:  Collector.vbs 
'* Created: July 4, 2005 
'* Version: 2.1 
'* Author:  Mark Barwinski, Naval Postgraduate School 
'*  
'* Parameters: FF (Firefox), FFSEC (Firefox Secure)  
'*   IE (Internet Explorer), IESEC (Internet Explorer Secure)  
'*  
'* Description: Collects hosts file located at 
'*   c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc 
'* 
'*   Collects Favorites for IE located at 
'*   c:\document and settings\administrator\favorites 
'* 
'*   DISABLED 
'*   Collects Cookies for IE located at 
'*   c:\document and settings\administrator\cookies 
'* 
'*   ** If Firefox then it collects the following: 
'*   Collects hosts file located at 
'*   c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc 
'* 
'*   DISABLED 
'*   Collects Cookies for Firefox located at 
'*   c:\document and settings\administrator\application data\_ 
'*    \mozilla\firefox\profiles\xxxxx.default\cookies.txt 
'* 
'*   Collects Bookmarks 
'*   c:\document and settings\administrator\application data\_ 
'*   
 \mozilla\firefox\profiles\xxxxx.default\bookmarks.html 
'* 
'*   Collects user preferences 
'*   c:\document and settings\administrator\application data\_ 
'*    \mozilla\firefox\profiles\xxxxx.default\prefs.js 
'* 
'* 
'*   Additionally, resets host file, cookies, and favorites for 
IE 
'*   and Pref, hosts, bookmarks, and cookies files for IE 







'* Output:  Saves files with the URL name appended to them for  
'*   identification 
'* 







   Dim Platform, args, Target, Destination, Errors, ErrorsFile, i, argNames 
   Dim Hosts, IECookies, IECookies2, FFCookies, IEFavorites, FFBookmarks, 
FFPreferences 
   Dim NewFileName, objShell, oFS 
   Dim colUserEnvVars, BaselineHosts, IEBaselineCookies, IEBaselineFavorites, 
FFBaselineCookies, FFBaselineBookmarks, FFBaselinePreferences 
   Dim objFolder, objFSO, colFiles, objFile, File1, File2, objScriptExec, 
strShellOutput, FileReport, NegativeReport 
   Dim profileNum 
    
137 
   Const ForReading = 1 
   Const ForAppending = 8 
    
   Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
   Set colUserEnvVars = objShell.Environment("Process") 
   Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
   Set oFS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
 
   On Error Resume Next 
   profileNum = getProfileFolder() 
   On Error Goto 0 
   
   Hosts = "C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\Etc\hosts" 
   BaselineHosts = "C:\tools\baseline\hosts"   
   IEBaselineCookies = "c:\tools\baseline\Cookies\"    
   IEBaselineFavorites = "c:\tools\baseline\Favorites" 
   IECookies = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Cookies\" 
   IEFavorites = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Favorites\" 
   FFCookies = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Application 
Data\Mozilla\firefox\profiles\" & profileNum & "\cookies.txt" 
   FFBookmarks = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Application 
Data\Mozilla\firefox\profiles\" & profileNum & "\bookmarks.html" 
   FFPreferences = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Application 
Data\Mozilla\firefox\profiles\" & profileNum & "\prefs.js" 
   FFBaselineCookies = "c:\tools\baseline\Cookies.txt" 
   FFBaselineBookmarks = "c:\tools\baseline\Bookmarks.html" 
   FFBaselinePreferences = "c:\tools\baseline\prefs.js" 
  
  
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   Dim CurrentURL  
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    
    
    
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   'Check to see if any arguments were passed to the script 
   'arguments may be: FF, FFSEC, IE, IESEC depending on the 
   'platform 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
       
Set args = WScript.Arguments 
   Set argNames = WScript.Arguments.Unnamed 
    
   if (args.Count <= 0) then 
    Platform = "" 
    WScript.Echo "Must enter a platform parameter" & vbCRLF & "FF = Firefox" 
& _ 
    vbCRLF & "FFSEC = Firefox Secure" & vbCRLF & "IE = Internet Explorer" & _ 
    vbCRLF & "IESEC = Internet Explorer Secure" 
    WScript.Quit() 
   else 
    Platform = args.Item(0) 
    CurrentURL = args.Item(1) 
    if ((args.Item(0) = "IE") or (args.Item(0) = "IESEC")) then 
     CollectIE() 
 else  
     if ((args.Item(0) = "FF") or (args.Item(0) = "FFSEC")) then 
      CollectFirefox() 
     end if 
    end if 
   end if 
          
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   'CollectIE 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   sub CollectIE()  
    
   Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" 
   ErrorsFile = "s:\" & Platform & "\errors.txt" 
   NegativeReport = Destination & CurrentURL & "Negative DIFF Report.txt" 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
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   DIFF Hosts, BaselineHosts 
 
   ResetIE_Files()  
   end sub 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
       
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   'CollectFirefox 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   sub CollectFirefox()  
 
   Destination = "s:\" & Platform & "\" 
   ErrorsFile = "s:\" & Platform & "\errors.txt" 
   NegativeReport = Destination & CurrentURL & "Negative DIFF Report.txt" 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   DIFF Hosts, BaselineHosts 
   DIFF FFBookmarks, FFBaselineBookmarks 
   DIFF FFPreferences, FFBaselinePreferences 
   ResetFF_Files() 
    
   end sub 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
             
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   'Get Profile Folder Name 
   'Returns the name of any default profile for Firefox 
   '/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   function getProfileFolder()    
 dim inputstring, re, demofolder, subfol, folcoll, pFolderName, 
FirefoxProfile  
 dim objMatch, folderPath 
 Set re = new regexp 
   
 re.Pattern = "\w{8}\.default" 
 re.IgnoreCase = true 
 re.Global = true 
 folderPath = colUserEnvVars("HOMEPATH") & "\Application 
Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles" 
 Set demofolder = objFSO.getFolder(folderPath) 
 Set folcoll = demofolder.SubFolders 
 for each subfol in folcoll 
  inputstring = inputstring & " " & subfol.Name  
   
 next 
 Set pFolderName = re.Execute(inputstring) 
  
 for each objMatch in pFolderName 
  FirefoxProfile = objMatch.Value 
 Next  
 
 getProfileFolder = FirefoxProfile 
   end function  
    
    
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
'Reset IE Files 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
sub ResetIE_Files()    
 
  Set Target = objFSO.GetFile("C:\tools\baseline\hosts") 
  Target.Copy("C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\Etc\hosts") 
  
   
  Set objFolder = objFSO.GetFolder(IECookies)  
  Set colFiles = objFolder.Files 
  For Each objFile in colFiles 
   if objFile.Type = "Text Document" then 
    objFSO.DeleteFile(objFile.Path), True 
   end if 
  Next 
   
  objFSO.DeleteFile(IEFavorites & "\*.*"), true 
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  objFSO.DeleteFolder(IEFavorites & "\*"), true 





'Reset FF Files 
'/////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
sub ResetFF_Files()    
 
Set Target = objFSO.GetFile("C:\tools\baseline\hosts") 
Target.Copy("C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\Etc\hosts") 
 
objFSO.CopyFile "c:\tools\baseline\Bookmarks.html", "c:\Documents And 
settings\Administrator\Application Data\Mozilla\firefox\profiles\" & profileNum 
& "\bookmarks.html" 
objFSO.CopyFile "c:\tools\baseline\cookies.txt", "c:\Documents And 
settings\Administrator\Application Data\Mozilla\firefox\profiles\" & profileNum 
& "\cookies.txt" 
objFSO.CopyFile "c:\tools\baseline\prefs.js", "c:\Documents And 





Sub DIFF(File1, File2) 
 File1 = Chr(34) & File1 & Chr(34) 
 File2 = Chr(34) & File2 & Chr(34) 
 Set objScriptExec = objShell.Exec("c:\tools\diff -s " & File1 & " " & 
File2) 
 strShellOutput = objScriptExec.StdOut.ReadAll 
 If Len(strShellOutput) = 0 then 
   
  if (oFS.FileExists(NegativeReport)) then 
   Set FileReport = oFS.OpenTextFile(NegativeReport, 
ForAppending)  
  else 
   Set FileReport = oFS.CreateTextFile(NegativeReport, False) 
  end if 
   
  FileReport.WriteLine("Unchanged : " & File2) 
 else 
  if InStr(strShellOutput, "identical") > 0 then 
   if (oFS.FileExists(NegativeReport)) then 
    Set FileReport = oFS.OpenTextFile(NegativeReport, 
ForAppending)  
   else 
    Set FileReport = oFS.CreateTextFile(NegativeReport, 
False) 
   end if 
  FileReport.WriteLine("Unchanged : " & File2) 
  else 
   NewFileName = Destination & CurrentURL & "Browser_DATA.txt" 
   if (oFS.FileExists(NewFileName )) then 
    Set FileReport = oFS.OpenTextFile(NewFileName , 
ForAppending)  
   else 
    Set FileReport = oFS.CreateTextFile(NewFileName , 
False) 
   end if 
   FileReport.WriteLine(strShellOutput) 
 
  end if  
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APPENDIX B – REGISTRY KEYS 
This appendix provides a list of the registry keys queried by script registry.vbs.  















HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load  









HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components    




HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellExecuteHooks   
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved   
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer 




HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\SearchUrl 
















HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls   







HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders 

















































APPENDIX C – OSIRIS REPORTS 
This appendix provides reports generated by Osiris Host Integrity System.  
Reports for the three most infected test beds are provided – bank, real estate, and online 
travel-related web sites.   The reports show an entry code, test bed name (e.g., [IE]), a 
[cmp] or [new] for the type of event, the full path of the changed or new file, and the date 
and time associated with the file.  
 
A. BANKING SECTOR – IE 
     compare time: Mon Jul 11 10:04:20 2005 
             host: IE 
      scan config:  () 
         log file: 4 
    base database: 2 
 compare database: 3 
 
[211][IE][cmp][c:\windows\system32\drivers\PROCEXP.SYS][mtime][Wed Jul 06 15:29:20 2005][Sun Jul 
10 21:18:40 2005] 

























[223][IE][cmp][mod_kmods][service:RasAuto][service:RasAuto;dname:Remote Access Auto Connection 
Manager;status:stopped][service:RasAuto;dname:Remote Access Auto Connection Manager;status:running] 
[223][IE][cmp][mod_kmods][service:RasMan][service:RasMan;dname:Remote Access Connection 









        checksums: 1 
       SUID files: 0 
 root-owned files: 3 
 file permissions: 0 
              new: 18 
          missing: 2 
total differences: 45 
 
B. REAL ESTATE SECTOR - IE 
     compare time: Sun Jul 24 16:33:50 2005 
             host: IE 
      scan config:  () 
         log file: 7 
    base database: 5 
 compare database: 6 
[202][IE][missing][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Favorites\Desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\cfout.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\djtopr1150.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\jkill.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\umqltg4cl_.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\0TUZODQB\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\2LNGD472\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\2LNGD472\install\1331\135.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\2LNGD472\somegirls\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\2LNGD472\www.hotels\1331\135.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\3V1F7XWK\WebRebates\1331\135.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\3V1F7XWK\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\3V1F7XWK\thumb\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\4P6BKXUR\PRScript\1331\135.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\4P6BKXUR\www.cheaptickets\1331\135.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AB2VELEN\Fab\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AB2VELEN\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AB2VELEN\intonantion\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AB2VELEN\js_code\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AB2VELEN\nem220\1331\135.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\GHM3WTYV\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\K1MRK9QR\wsem303\1331\135.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\K33NMO55\actalert\1331\135.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\K33NMO55\desktop.ini] 
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[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\ODM7CXIB\blah\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\ODM7CXIB\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\OHQBC9AV\ads\1331\135.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\OHQBC9AV\cheaptickets\1331\135.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\OHQBC9AV\www.cheaptickets\1331\135.com] 




[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\optimize.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Media Gateway\Info.txt] 

















































[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\ClientAX.dll] 
[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\MediaGatewayX.dll] 












        checksums: 0 
       SUID files: 0 
 root-owned files: 0 
 file permissions: 0 
              new: 96 
          missing: 1 
total differences: 97 
 
C. ONLINE TRAVEL SECTOR – IE 
     compare time: Sun Jul 24 17:28:33 2005 
             host: IE 
      scan config:  () 
         log file: 7 
    base database: 5 
 compare database: 6 
[202][IE][missing][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Favorites\Desktop.ini] 
[211][IE][cmp][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\desktop.ini][mtime][Tue Jul 19 
21:02:50 2005][Tue Jul 19 20:52:05 2005] 
[211][IE][cmp][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\ntuser.ini][mtime][Tue Jul 19 20:54:44 2005][Tue 
Jul 19 20:50:10 2005] 
[211][IE][cmp][C:\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\desktop.ini][mtime][Tue Jul 19 
21:01:05 2005][Tue Jul 19 20:51:47 2005] 
[211][IE][cmp][C:\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\desktop.ini][mtime][Tue Jul 19 
21:01:05 2005][Tue Jul 19 20:51:47 2005] 
[211][IE][cmp][C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\tools.conf][mtime][Tue Jul 19 21:02:53 
2005][Tue Jul 19 20:52:11 2005] 





[211][IE][cmp][C:\Tools\urls.txt][mtime][Tue Jul 19 20:16:36 2005][Tue Jul 19 20:18:17 2005] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Macromedia\Flash 
Player\macromedia.com\support\flashplayer\sys\#i.cmpnet.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\cfout.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\djtopr1150.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\jkill.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\umqltg4cl_.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\89Q7ST27\a\1331\135.com] 
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[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\A956J6TO\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\A956J6TO\fl_26063_eng\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\A956J6TO\install\1331\135.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\A956J6TO\sidecar_national\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\AP7418R2\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\H0CVLTWX\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\JBLFJPGS\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\K5UZ4LE3\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\K5UZ4LE3\wsem303\1331\135.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\O7ZRY05P\a\1331\135.com] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\O7ZRY05P\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\PZV7XPOA\WebRebates\1331\135.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\PZV7XPOA\desktop.ini] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\PZV7XPOA\nem220\1331\135.dll] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\PZV7XPOA\rorbutton\1331\135.txt] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\S3LZYYV1\actalert\1331\135.exe] 




[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\optimize.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\actalert.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Internet Optimizer\update\install.exe] 
[203][IE][new][C:\Program Files\Media Gateway\Info.txt] 

















































[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\ClientAX.dll] 
[203][IE][new][c:\windows\Downloaded Program Files\MediaGatewayX.dll] 














































        checksums: 1 
       SUID files: 0 
 root-owned files: 2 
 file permissions: 0 
              new: 97 
          missing: 2 
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APPENDIX D – PATCH LEVEL 
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APPENDIX E – BROWSER SETTINGS 
This appendix shows pertinent browser settings for the IESEC and FFSEC test 
beds.  For Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, the Security, Advanced, and Privacy tabs are 
shown.  For Mozilla’s Firefox, General, Web Features, and Advanced tabs are shown.  
Additionally, the content of the Prefs.js file is provided.  This file contains Firefox user 
preferences.  
154 
A. IE SETTINGS  
155 
 






# Mozilla User Preferences 
 
/* Do not edit this file. 
 * 
 * If you make changes to this file while the browser is running, 
 * the changes will be overwritten when the browser exits. 
 * 
 * To make a manual change to preferences, you can visit the URL 
about:config 
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